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CHARACTER AND CONTEXT: WHAT VIRTUE THEORY CAN 
TEACH US ABOUT A PROSECUTOR’S ETHICAL DUTY TO 
“SEEK JUSTICE” 
R. Michael Cassidy* 
When it comes right down to it, of course, there is no institutional 
substitute for personal integrity.1 
—H. Richard Uviller 
INTRODUCTION 
Almost forty years ago, Monroe Freedman rocked the field of legal 
ethics with his provocative and highly controversial article Professional 
Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest 
Questions.2  Professor Freedman taught us that stating ethical rules in the 
form of “salutary generalities” does little to assist a lawyer in confronting 
practical problems in context,3 particularly in the field of criminal litigation 
where a defendant’s personal liberty is at stake and constitutional 
protections for the accused are paramount to the truth finding function of 
the courts.4 
Like Freedman, my goal in this Article is to discuss three difficult 
 
        * Associate Professor, Boston College Law School.  I thank my colleagues Judy 
McMorrow, Ray Madoff, and Paul Tremblay for their thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft, and my students Joshua Gallitano, Martha Wilson-Byrne, and Robert Frederickson for 
their capable and energetic research assistance. 
 1 H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD: IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR? 66 
(1999). 
 2 Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: 
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).  Professor Freedman 
addressed the following three issues in this 1966 article: whether it is proper for a criminal 
defense attorney to cross-examine a witness who he knows to be telling the truth; whether it 
is proper for a criminal defense attorney to put a witness on the stand when he has reason to 
know that the witness will commit perjury; and whether it is proper for a criminal defense 
attorney to give his client legal advice when he has reason to believe that such legal advice 
will tempt the client to commit perjury.  Id. at 1469. 
 3 Id. at 1470; see id. at 1484 (“[I]t  is precisely when one tries to act on abstract ethical 
advice that the practicalities intrude, often rendering unethical the well-intended act.”). 
 4 Id. at 1471, 1482. 
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ethical problems confronted in criminal practice.  But unlike Freedman, I 
intend to address these controversies from the perspective of the criminal 
prosecutor.  Specifically, when is it proper for a prosecutor to offer 
charging or sentencing concessions to an accomplice in order to secure the 
accomplice’s testimony against a codefendant?  When, if ever, may a 
prosecutor impeach a defense witness who the prosecutor believes has 
testified truthfully, and how should this cross-examination be conducted?  
And finally, how should a prosecutor react at trial when opposing counsel 
appears to be advocating ineffectively on behalf of his client? 
These three quandaries are particularly challenging for prosecutors, 
for at least two reasons.  First, neither the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct nor the American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to the 
Administration of Criminal Justice provide meaningful guidance on these 
questions.  Moreover, the resolution of these issues is highly dependent 
both on the specific factual context in which the questions arise and the 
prosecutor’s resolution of a variety of competing tensions at play in the 
particular case.  Nonetheless, I will argue that these dilemmas are indeed 
questions of ethics, and that ethical reasoning can help guide us to a 
solution.  This brings me to a second goal of the Article, which is to discuss 
how this philosophy of virtue ethics may help us think about difficult 
questions of professional responsibility for public prosecutors. 
The three questions I will address in this Article fall squarely within 
the interstices of professional regulation of lawyers.  Model Rule 3.8 
(entitled “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor”) does not purport to 
answer any of them.5  As one commentator has lamented, Model Rule 3.8 
“barely scratch[es] the surface”6 of a prosecutor’s unique responsibilities.7  
 
 5 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004). 
 6 See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 607, 616 (1999). 
 7 Model Rule 3.8 contains proscriptions relating to pre-trial conduct, the threshold for 
commencing criminal charges, and publicity.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
3.8.  These proscriptions really are not “ethical” rules at all—they set a floor of minimally 
acceptable behavior by describing actions that a prosecutor may not take (“prohibitions”).  
See, e.g., id. R. 3.8(a) (prosecutor may not prosecute without probable cause); id. R. 3.8(b) 
(prosecutor may not obtain from unrepresented accused waiver of pretrial rights); id. R. 
3.8(c) (prosecutor may not subpoena attorney to grand jury to give information about past or 
present client except in limited circumstances).  For areas where the Rules describe the 
actions that a prosecutor must take, see id. R. 3.8(d) (prosecutor must make reasonable 
efforts to assure that accused has been advised of right to counsel); id. R. 3.8(e) (prosecutor 
must make timely disclosure of exculpatory evidence).  Of course, prosecutors must adhere 
to the more general professional norms applicable to all members of the bar (e.g., being 
candid with the tribunal in compliance with Rule 3.3; acting without a conflict of interest in 
compliance with Rule 1.7(a)(2); acting with competence and diligence in compliance with 
Rules 1.1 and 1.3).  But these rules, like Model Rule 3.8, are not grounded in moral 
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Buried within the comments to this rule, however, is one generalized 
standard that may provide a starting point for our inquiry.  Comment 1 to 
Model Rule 3.8 states that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a 
minister of justice, and not simply that of an advocate.”8  This language, 
emanating from a 1934 Supreme Court opinion,9 is echoed in the American 
Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Standards: “The duty of the prosecutor 
is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”10 
The legal profession has left much of a prosecutor’s day-to-day 
decisionmaking unregulated, in favor of this catch-all “seek justice” 
admonition.11  But what does it mean to “seek justice” if you are a public 
prosecutor?  “Justice” is an example of a highly generalized axiom of 
behavior—it does not set forth permissible and impermissible conduct, and 
it does not set out criteria for how prosecutors are supposed to determine 
what is just.12  “The reality is that justice is an elusive and difficult 
concept.”13  “[W]hat prosecutor doesn’t think that he or she is ‘seeking 
justice’ . . . ?”14  Justice might mean several overlapping but different 
things simultaneously; for example, it might mean safeguarding the 
substantive and procedural rights of the accused,15 exhibiting general 
“fairness” to others (including not only the defendant but also the victim 
and other witnesses),16 showing consistency in decisionmaking,17 or 
 
reasoning; rather, they were enacted to ensure the efficiency of the legal system and to foster 
judicial outcomes worthy of respect.  Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical 
Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 973 (1987) (arguing that model rules “eschew 
descriptions of morals” in favor of regulations without ethical content).  Elsewhere, Shaffer 
has written that what the American legal system calls ethics “are traffic regulations that 
make professional intercourse efficient and keep professional practice at least . . . within the 
boundaries set by the criminal law.”  THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 131 
(1987). 
 8 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 9 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1934). 
 10 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE Standard 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS] 
(emphasis added). 
 11 See Green, supra note 6, at 616. 
 12 Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, 
Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 256 
(1993).  Another commentator has labeled the seek justice mandate “hopelessly abstract.”   
Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 197, 227 (1988). 
 13 Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 355, 379 (2001). 
 14 Id. at 378. 
 15 Fisher, supra note 12, at 236–37. 
 16 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 111–14 (1971) (equating justice with 
fairness towards others). 
CASSIDY_FINALREAD 11/13/2006  7:18:19 PM 
104 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  [VOL. 82: 2 
promoting public safety.18  This admonition does not provide prosecutors 
with any real guidance on how to act in particularly complex areas.  At 
best, “[i]ts vagueness leaves prosecutors with only their individual sense of 
morality to determine just conduct.”19  At worst, it allows prosecutors to 
rationalize any response to an ethical dilemma by arguing that their chosen 
conduct increases the likelihood of conviction and incarceration of a guilty 
person. 
In light of the amorphous “seek justice” standard, there have been a 
number of proposals put forth by commentators to better channel 
prosecutorial discretion.  Bruce Green has argued that Model Rule 3.8 
needs to be expanded to reach more discretionary decisionmaking by 
prosecutors.20  He and Fred Zacharias have also argued that prosecutor’s 
offices across the country need to articulate and publicize office policies 
and principles of decisionmaking to guide the discretion of individual 
attorneys.21  The late Richard Uviller has suggested that functions within 
the prosecutor’s office should be split between quasi-judicial functions 
(investigation, case evaluation, and plea bargaining) and adversarial 
functions (litigation) in order to ensure that the pressures of the adversarial 
process do not corrupt the independence of a prosecutor’s judgment.22  
Both Stanley Fisher and Leslie Griffin have argued in favor of better 
training and closer supervision of prosecutors.23 
My point in this Article is not to quibble with any of these 
recommendations; all of them have merit, and, with the exception of the 
call for stronger rules,24 many of them are now being implemented in 
 
 17 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 158 (1961) (equating justice with treating 
like cases alike). 
 18 For a utilitarian theory of justice focusing on maximizing the common good, see 
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 242–64 (George Sher ed., 2001). 
 19 Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can 
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48 (1991). 
 20 See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1590; 
Green, supra note 6, at 616. 
 21 Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
837, 897. 
 22 See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a 
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1716 (2000). 
 23 See Fisher, supra note 12, at 257; Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 262 (2001). 
 24 In the 2002 amendments to the Model Rules, the ABA affirmatively decided to 
“leave questions of prosecutorial conduct for another day,” partly because it anticipated 
strenuous objections from the Department of Justice, and partly because the Ethics 2000 
Commission contained no members currently serving as prosecutors.  Bruce A. Green, 
Prosecuting Means More Than Locking Up Bad Guys, LITIG., Fall 2005, at 12, 16. 
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prosecutor’s offices across this country.25  My point is that in a largely 
discretionary system, none of these suggestions—taken either alone or 
collectively—will insulate criminal defendants from the potentially ruinous 
decisions of overzealous prosecutors.  The scholarly discourse about 
prosecutorial ethics to date has been missing an important element—a 
focus on the character of individual prosecutors making discretionary 
decisions. 
Following the Clinton impeachment there has been a rising national 
debate about the character of our country’s leaders.26  This debate has 
rekindled interest in what kind of people we want our public officials to 
be.27  To date, however, the public discourse on the subject of character has 
greatly outpaced the scholarly literature.  While legal ethicists such as 
Thomas Shaffer and Reed Loder have examined issues of professional 
responsibility through the lens of virtue ethics,28 there has been little 
scholarly discussion of how this field of philosophy might inform our 
understanding of prosecutorial discretion.  Prosecutors are leaders in our 
criminal justice system who wield a great deal of power to affect the day-
to-day lives of our citizens.  It is past time we devote serious attention to 
the character of the individuals making these important decisions. 
Beginning with the ethics of Aristotle and building on the work of 
modern philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre29 and Bernard 
Williams,30 I intend in this Article to examine the virtues expected of a 
public prosecutor.  After a brief review of virtue ethics and its contribution 
to moral reasoning, I will analyze each of the three “hard” questions of 
prosecutorial ethics I posed above.  In each of these situations, how would 
a virtuous prosecutor approach the problem?  How might a focus on virtue 
 
 25 See, e.g., Panel Discussion, Criminal Discovery in Practice, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
781, 794–95 (1999) (comments of Judge Gerrilyn G. Brill) (discussing training programs in 
effect at many prosecutor’s offices with respect to discovery); Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing 
Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 
1023–24 (2005) (discussing Washington state prosecutorial guidelines for charging and plea 
bargaining); cf. TEX. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 309(a) (2005) (broadening Model Rule 
3.8 by prohibiting prosecutor from threatening criminal charges without probable cause). 
 26 See Kenneth L. Woodward, What is Virtue, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1994, at 38, 38. 
 27 Gary Watson, On the Primacy of Character, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND 
MORALITY 449, 462 (Owen Flanagan & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1990) (citing a 
“renewal of interest” in the ethics of virtue).  
 28 See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Integrity and Epistemic Passion, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
841, 841–42 (2002) (“Virtue and character, subjects long out of fashion in moral philosophy 
and even ordinary life, have enjoyed a rather sparkling revival despite the longstanding 
preoccupation in ethics with principles to guide action.”); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Living 
One Way in Town and Another Way at Home, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 879, 889–90 (1997). 
 29 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6–22 (2d ed. 1984).  
 30 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 1–29 (1985).  
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(and particularly the Aristotelian virtues of courage, fairness, honesty, and 
prudence) contribute to the analysis of these three ethical dilemmas? 
Any attempt to regulate how prosecutors should “act” in certain highly 
contextualized and nuanced situations by developing more specific 
normative rules is unworkable.  Prosecutorial discretion would be better 
constrained in these areas by focusing on what type of character traits 
prosecutors should possess or strive to acquire.  Only after we answer the 
critical preliminary question of who we want our public prosecutors to “be” 
can we possibly hope to discern what we expect our prosecutors to “do.”  
In the concluding Part of the Article, I will demonstrate that a renewed 
emphasis on character and virtue has direct implications for how 
prosecutor’s offices should be structured and organized in this country, and 
how individual prosecutors working within these offices should aspire to 
conduct their professional lives. 
I.  VIRTUE ETHICS: ARISTOTLE AND BEYOND 
Legal theorists typically distinguish between two types of moral 
theories—deontological and consequentialist.31  Deontologists such as 
Immanuel Kant posit that we must look to prior principles in order to 
decide upon a moral course of action.32  One can deduce these prior 
principles (or moral truths) by asking whether one would be happy living in 
a world where everyone behaved as proposed.  If the answer is no, then one 
has a duty not to behave that way.  The categorical imperative—“the moral 
law according to which one should act only on principles that one can 
accept everyone’s acting upon”33—provides the source of the duty to 
determine right action.  In a deontological ethical system, the right is prior 
to the good; good outcomes will be achieved if everyone behaves according 
to their rights and responsibilities.34 
A consequentialist moral theory looks at the outcome of human 
decisions.  A course of action is morally proper if it increases human 
happiness (pleasure) and improper if it increases human suffering (pain).35  
 
 31 Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification 
for Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2348, 2395 (1990). 
 32 IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical Foundations of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
KANT 154, 164–67 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., Carl J. Friedrich & James C. Meredith trans. 
1993). 
 33 Roger Crisp, Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues, in HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE? 
1, 7 (Roger Crisp ed., 1996). 
 34 See James F. Keenan, Proposing Cardinal Virtues, 56 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 709, 
714–15 (1995). 
 35 JEREMY BENTHAM, Article on Utilitarianism, in DEONTOLOGY 293–96 (Amnon 
Goldworth ed., 1983).  
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Determining a proper course of action requires an actor to weigh the social 
utility and disutility of his conduct to determine whether it produces, on 
balance, beneficial consequences.36  Although a so-called “rights-
utilitarian” would concede that respect for individual rights and human 
autonomy is a value that contributes to aggregate social welfare,37 even this 
more finely calibrated form of consequentialism would allow an actor to 
violate the rights of certain individuals in order to protect the rights of 
many others.38 
Approaching professional ethics from either a purely deontological 
perspective or a purely consequentialist perspective presents several 
problems.39 To paraphrase Bernard Williams, if someone needs to 
rationalize saving his wife from a burning building on background 
principles [either deontological (duty) or consequentialist (maximizing 
happiness and minimizing pain)] he is having “one thought too many.”40  
Values and principles alone cannot determine proper outcomes, because 
moral judgment is not just about arriving at appropriate answers—or what 
Gerald Postema facetiously termed “getting our moral sums right.”41  
Moral judgment is also about nurturing the appropriate attitudes and 
reactions to the situations in which individuals find themselves.42  For 
 
 36 Wells, supra note 31, at 2395. 
 37 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28–33 (1974) (distinguishing 
what he terms a “utilitarianism of rights” theory, which has minimizing rights violations as 
one goal of a utilitarian calculus, from other utilitarian theories which view rights as side 
constraints to the goal of maximizing happiness, thus constraining goal directed behavior 
even if it would lead to a net social benefit). 
 38 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required: 
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 737–39 (2005). 
 39 One critique of deontological moral theory is that an individual actor may 
misconstrue rules, or may misprioritize norms reflected in the rules.  “It may be futile to 
search for a general reductive method or a clear set of priority rules to structure our basic 
concerns.  There is always likely to be a significant gap between general practical theory 
and actual decision and practice.”  Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional 
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 67 (1980).  One critique of utilitarian moral theory is that it 
would permit an actor to treat another individual as a means towards societal ends, rather 
than an autonomous end in himself.  See IMMANUEL KANT, Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysic of Morals, in KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON 
THE THEORY OF ETHICS 1, 55–57 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., London: 6th ed., rev. 
1898). For example, a purely utilitarian theory of prosecutorial ethics may permit an actor to 
encourage police perjury or withhold exculpatory evidence from the accused, if he 
reasonably believed that such actions would go undetected and would maximize social 
welfare by leading to the conviction of a highly dangerous and guilty defendant. 
 40 BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons, Character and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1, 18 
(1981). 
 41 Postema, supra note 39, at 68. 
 42 Id. 
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these reasons, it is critical to approach problems of professional ethics from 
a perspective that recognizes the importance of character.43 
A focus on character may help to bridge the gap where both 
deontological and utilitarian reasoning fail.  For example, there is an 
important difference between “being truthful,” which is a good character 
trait, and “not telling lies,” which is a rule.44  One might violate the 
proscription on lying in certain compelling circumstances without being an 
untruthful person (e.g., lying about whether Anne Frank and her family are 
hiding in your attic in order to protect them from arrest by the Nazi 
forces).45  Deontological reasoning simply fails to provide meaningful 
guidance in that situation.  Moreover, to be an authentically truthful person 
one must at times speak honestly, even if it might cause great pain to 
others.  Cheating on your tax return is wrong, even where it is necessary to 
finance a life-saving medical procedure for a family member.  In this 
situation, purely utilitarian forms of moral reasoning may also fail us.  
These examples illustrate that if lawyers are expected to be honest 
throughout their professional activities, they must be taught to prize the 
truth, and not simply admonished “not to lie.”46 
Virtue ethics is a teleological philosophy rooted in the classical 
humanism of Aristotle.47  The course which a moral agent takes is directed 
 
 43 Id. at 70. 
 44 Shaffer, supra note 28, at 890.  In discussing the gap between rules of professional 
responsibility and ethical conduct, Thomas Shaffer has noted that the character Atticus 
Finch in Harper Lee’s novel To Kill a Mockingbird was a person who prized honesty, but 
was willing to lie to protect vulnerable Boo Radley from certain ruin.  “[L]ying to protect 
Boo Radley is the sort of thing Atticus would do,” notwithstanding that he is an honest man.  
Thomas L. Shaffer, The Gentleman in Professional Ethics, 10 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 30 (1984). 
 45 This hypothetical is reminiscent of Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between principles 
and rules.  Rules are absolute.  If two rules conflict, one of them is not a valid rule.  
Principles have varying degrees of weight and importance, and at times may conflict with 
one another.  When two principles intersect, in order to resolve the conflict the actor must 
take into account the relative weight and purpose of each.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22–28 (1978). 
 46 Rosalind Wursthouse, Normative Virtue Ethics, in HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE?, supra 
note 33, at 19, 27. 
 47 Although Aristotle’s views have been justifiably criticized because his politics were 
exclusionary (for example, he did not think that slaves or women—non-members of the 
polis—could aspire to lead a flourishing life), we do not need to agree with those particular 
views in order to take seriously his theories of character, reason, and human nature.  
Aristotle’s theories reflect the historical and political situation in ancient Greece, and may 
certainly be adjusted to fit changing times.  See Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: 
Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 
82 CAL. L. REV. 329, 372–73 (1994); Susan Moller Okin, Feminism, Moral Development, 
and the Virtues, in HOW SHOULD ONE LIVE?, supra note 33, at 211, 211–16. 
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toward a “telos,” or goal.48  But unlike consequentialist theories such as 
utilitarianism, where the ultimate goal of human action is maximizing 
happiness, the “telos” for a virtue ethicist is individual human 
flourishing.49  The concept of the good is prior to the concept of the right, 
but what is good is determined by intrinsic human excellence rather than 
external outcomes.50 
Aristotle emphasized the sort of person we must become if we want to 
live a good life.51  Virtue is acquired through practice.  Repetition of 
virtuous actions will lead to virtuous character (habit), which in turn will 
lead to more virtuous action.  Just as men “become builders by building 
houses,” they become just persons by practicing just actions and self-
controlled persons by practicing self control.52  Only by putting the virtues 
into practice does the good become integrated in our character.53  An action 
is right if it is in conformity with the virtues, and improper or unethical if it 
is contrary to the virtues.54 
The proper threshold question for virtue ethicists is thus not “what 
should one do?” but “what kind of person should one be?”  Only when we 
answer that question can we possibly hope to discern what to do.55  
Whereas deontological theories are concerned with universal principles or 
rules (what is “right”), virtue ethics is concerned with the goal of becoming 
a good person.56  “[G]oodness conveys the agent as striving out of love to 
realize the right.”57  For a virtue ethicist, “how it is best or right or proper 
to conduct oneself is explained in terms of how it is best for a human being 
to be.”58  Virtue ethics makes the characteristics of a good person the focus 
of analysis, “on the assumption that one who is good is likely to do the 
 
 48 MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 148; see OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 22, 362 
(Simon Blackburne ed., 2005). 
 49 MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 185; see James F. Keenan, Virtue Ethics: Making a 
Case as it Comes of Age, 67 THOUGHT 115, 123 (1992).  Aristotle’s term “eudaimonea,” is 
usually translated to mean “happiness,” “flourishing,” or “becoming an excellent human 
being.”  ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VII, ch. 12–14, at 204–08 (Christopher 
Rowe trans., Oxford 2002); see WILLIAM J. PRIOR, VIRTUE AND KNOWLEDGE 146, 149 
(1991); James W. Perkins, Virtues and the Lawyer, 38 CATH. LAW. 185, 198 (1998). 
 50 Watson, supra note 27, at 450, 461.  
 51  ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. II, ch. 1, at 111–12. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See GERMAIN GRISEZ, CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 55 (1983). 
 54 Watson, supra note 27, at 458.  
 55 Crisp, supra note 33, at 7. 
 56 See Robert Araujo, The Virtuous Lawyer: Paradigm and Possibility, 50 SMU L. 
REV. 433, 452 (1997); Keenan, supra note 49, at 120. 
 57 Keenan, supra note 49, at 121. 
 58 Watson, supra note 27, at 451.  
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right thing in most situations.”59 
It is important to distinguish virtue from two related but distinct 
concepts: value and honor.  Values are about personal preference (I might 
prefer fame to money, leisure time to material goods, or friendship to 
autonomy).  Virtues, on the other hand, are internal dispositions of 
character or mind that lead to human excellence.60  The virtues exert 
control on our external preferences, but they are both prior and superior to 
our value systems. 
Virtue is also distinct from honor.  Honor is often equated with 
status—the social prestige, accolades, and privilege that come from having 
a good reputation.61  Honor is not a virtue because it depends on the 
approval of others—“the gossip of the town and the judgment of 
circumstantial elites.”62  We honor others only because they have done 
something to merit the honor.63  Character, by contrast, comes from within, 
and is directed at helping us to become our best selves rather than attaining 
the approval of others.  For Aristotle, honor was at best only a goal 
secondary to virtue.64 
Individuals are not born with virtue, but they are born with the 
capacity to learn the virtues through nurturing and training.  Aristotle 
believed that we are not by nature either good or evil, although we may 
have tendencies toward one pole or another.65  During childhood and 
adolescence we acquire good or bad dispositions through the process of 
rewards and discouragement.66  A student of virtue performs virtuous acts, 
makes them a habit (integration), and then approaches particular situations 
by combining intellect and character through the process of practical 
wisdom, which will be discussed later in this section.67  Once moral virtues 
become habitual dispositions and are coupled with reason, they allow the 
individual “to [choose] freely the just and beautiful action[].”68 
 
 59 Loder, supra note 28, at 842 n.1. 
 60 Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1375 
(2005). 
 61 See Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honor, in REVISIONS: 
CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 172, 177 (Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair 
MacIntyre eds., 1983) (“The concept of honor implies that identity is essentially, or at least 
importantly, linked to institutional roles.”). 
 62 Thomas Shaffer, The Profession as a Moral Teacher, 18 ST. MARY’S L.J. 195, 248 
(1986).  
 63 MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 116. 
 64 Id. 
 65 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. II, ch. 1, at 111–12. 
 66 See JONATHAN JACOBS, ARISTOTLE’S VIRTUES 112 (2004).  
 67 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 11, at 185–86. 
 68 Richard Bodeus, Aristotle, in THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 52, 
67 (Richard W. Popkin ed., 1999). 
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Aristotle classified the virtues into two distinct categories: the moral 
virtues and the intellectual virtues.69  The moral virtues are those virtues 
that perfect the part of the soul which can be controlled or influenced by 
rationality.70  Aristotle emphasized eleven moral virtues: temperance, 
courage, industriousness, generosity (“magnanimity”), pride, good temper 
(“mildness”), truthfulness, friendliness, modesty, justice, and pleasantness 
(being “ready witted”).71  The intellectual virtues, for Aristotle, are those 
virtues that perfect the part of the soul which itself reasons, that is, the 
virtues that shape the capacity to reason.  The five intellectual virtues are 
understanding (intuition), science, theoretical wisdom (philosophy), craft 
(the art of production), and practical wisdom.72 
In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas synthesized Aristotelian 
philosophy and Christian tradition in his treatise Summa Theologica.73  For 
Aquinas, virtue is one of the necessary means by which a person is led to 
his perfection;74 that is, achieving the beatific vision and coming to know 
God.75  Aquinas agreed with Aristotle on what he termed the “human” 
virtues (both intellectual and moral) but added to Aristotle’s framework the 
“theological” virtues of faith, hope, and charity.76  Moreover, Aquinas 
grouped Aristotle’s natural virtues into what he termed the four “cardinal” 
virtues—prudence, justice, temperance, and courage.77  Aquinas saw all of 
Aristotle’s other moral virtues as subsumed or grouped within one of these 
four cardinal virtues.78 
In a grouping reminiscent of Aquinas, modern virtue ethicist Alasdair 
MacIntyre has seized upon justice, courage, and honesty as the most 
important virtues for individuals striving to be responsible moral agents.79  
 
 69 PRIOR, supra note 49, at 156. 
 70 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF ETHICS 64 (1998). 
 71 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. II, ch. 5–9, at 115–22; id. bk. IV, ch. 3, at 148–51; id. 
at 307 (table). 
 72 JACOBS, supra note 66, at 131; see  ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 3, at 178–
79. 
 73  THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican Province 
trans., Benzinger Bros. 1974). 
 74 Id. pt. I-II, q. 79, art. 4; id. pt. I-II, q. 56, art. 1.  
 75  Id. pt. I-II, q. 3, art. 8. 
 76 Id. pt. I-II, q. 58, art. 3 at 835; id. pt. I-II, q. 62, art. 3 at 852–53. 
 77 Id. pt. I-II, q. 61, art. 2, at 847. 
 78 Id. pt. I-II, q. 61, art. 3, at 847. 
 79 MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 191.  In After Virtue, MacIntyre criticizes as 
“emotivist” all contemporary moral debates.  Id. at 18–22.  MacIntyre believes that the 
assertion that something is the “right thing to do” is nothing more than expression of 
approval or disapproval of that conduct.  Id. at 19–20.  According to MacIntyre, debates 
between rights and utility, or freedom and equality, can have no rational end because they 
rest on different premises of what is good.  Id. at 21.  MacIntyre believes that utilitarian and 
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For the purposes of this Article, I intend to analyze these three key virtues 
identified by MacIntyre, in addition to the “cornerstone” Aristotelian and 
Thomistic virtue of practical wisdom (or “prudence”).  I will discuss what 
it means for a prosecutor to possess the virtues of justice, courage, honesty, 
and prudence.  And, in particular, I will examine how these virtues may 
shape the conduct of a prosecutor confronted by the three hard ethical 
questions posed at the beginning of this Article. 
Before I begin the discussion, let me first define the four key virtues 
that will be the focus of my argument: 
Justice.  Aristotle identified justice as the “complete virtue,” and spent 
all of Book V of Nicomachean Ethics discussing what it means to be a just 
person.80  Aristotle distinguished between universal justice—which is the 
complete or perfect virtue (“kratiste”)—from particular justice, which is a 
moral virtue on par with courage, temperance, etc.81  Universal justice is 
concerned with law abidingness and compliance with rules.82  Particular 
justice—the context in which I will use the term throughout this Article—is 
concerned with right relations towards others.83 
For Aristotle, particular justice is the virtue by which a person “lives 
in right relation with his neighbor.”84  Individuals must recognize each 
other’s existence and their right to co-exist.  Justice occurs where there is 
reciprocity, that is, where “every person renders to one another those 
concerns which each has for the self.”85  Aristotle believed that justice was 
closely related to friendship.  One can have friendship for pleasure, for 
advantage, or for good.  The best and highest form of friendship is a 
friendship of the third variety.  Where individual A is concerned for 
individual B for B’s own sake, rather than for the result accruing to A, A 
essentially recognizes B as another self.86  Justice is the virtue that prompts 
 
deontological arguments are morally incoherent, and the emotivist picture of the self has no 
social content because the rationality of judgment lies in the reasonableness of the starting 
premise.  Id. at 12–15.  MacIntyre argues that the key to leading a virtuous life is 
intelligibility; we are all authors of our own narratives, and intelligibility (the reasons for our 
choices) is the key link between action and the narrative of our life.  Id. at 209.  An 
intelligible narrative account makes sense of one’s decisions.  Id. at 209–10.  For MacIntyre, 
the only kind of coherent narrative that links birth to death is a quest for the good.  Id. at 
186–91. 
 80 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. V, at 158–76; PRIOR, supra note 49, at 168. 
 81 DAVID O’CONNOR, VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY 8 (1985).   
 82 Id. at 23. 
 83 Id.  
 84 JEAN PORTER, THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE, 31–32 (1990); see  ARISTOTLE, supra note 
49, bk. V, ch. 1, at 158–60. 
 85 Araujo, supra note 56, at 442. 
 86 See  ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk.VIII, ch. 3, at 210–12. 
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me to act for the sake of another’s well being, rather than just my own.87 
Bernard Williams equated the Aristotelian notion of justice (justice “in 
the particular”) to “fairness.”88  According to Williams, an unjust person is 
one who is “not . . . affected or moved by considerations of fairness.”89  
The vice of injustice is seen as “settled indifference” to others.90  For the 
remainder of this Article, I will adopt Bernard Williams’s construction of 
justice as fairness, and use the term “fairness” as a synonym for justice to 
avoid the obvious tautology that would result from attempting to identify 
the contours of a prosecutor’s duty to “seek justice” with reference to this 
cardinal virtue. 
Courage.  Courage is the virtue that enables an individual to do what 
is good notwithstanding harm, danger or risk to themselves.91  For Aristotle 
it was the mean between cowardice and false confidence, or “boldness.”92  
Alasdair MacIntyre saw courage as related to care and concern for others: 
“If someone says that he cares for some individual, community or cause, 
but is unwilling to risk harm or danger on his, her or its own behalf, he puts 
in question the genuineness of his care and concern.”93  Similarly, Reed 
Loder has captured the virtue of courage as the ability to “[w]ithstand[] 
pressure, even at some personal sacrifice.”94  With respect to the conduct 
of public officials, the virtue of courage is also implicated in the 
willingness to sacrifice short term benefits for longer range goals; that is, 
courage may enable a prosecutor, legislator or judge to “strike a proper 
balance between the immediate demands and concerns of the public and the 
long-range public good.”95 
Honesty.  Aristotle recognized the importance of being truthful in 
speech and action.96  For Aristotle, the excess of truthfulness was 
boastfulness and the deficiency of truthfulness was “self deprecation,” with 
the virtue of honesty being the mean between these two vices.97  In giving 
these examples, Aristotle clearly was focusing on truthfulness as important 
 
 87 PRIOR, supra note 49, at 174–75. 
 88 BERNARD WILLIAMS, Justice as Virtue, in MORAL LUCK, supra note 40, at 83, 90. 
 89 Id.  Williams disagreed with Aristotle that all injustice was motivated by 
“pleonexia”—the desire for more for oneself.  Id. at 91.  Williams thought that injustice 
could result from multiple motives, or from no motives at all.  Id. at 93. 
 90 Id. at 93; see also Loder, supra note 28, at 860 (observing that one aspect of integrity 
involves “[r]especting other people and having concern for their interests”). 
 91 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. III, ch. 9, at 137–38. 
 92 Id. bk. II, ch. 7, at 118–20; MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 117–18. 
 93 MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 192. 
 94 Loder, supra note 28, at 846. 
 95 Marie A. Failinger, Can a Good Judge Be a Good Politician?  Judicial Ethics from a 
Virtue Ethics Approach, 70 MO. L. REV. 433, 466 (2005). 
 96 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. IV, ch. 7, at 155. 
 97 Id. bk. II, ch. 7, at 118–20.   
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to an individual’s self assessment.98  But this virtue also has important 
implications for an individual’s assessment of external facts.  Thomas 
Shaffer characterized the virtue of honesty as “tolerance for ambiguity.”99  
A person is honest if he is comfortable with incongruity, and is willing to 
accept circumstances and other people for the way they are, rather than 
feeling the need to make them consistent with his own predispositions.  An 
honest person is thus open to evidence that discredits his own ideas or 
world view.100 
Prudence.  Prudence, or “practical wisdom,” is the one intellectual 
virtue which Aristotle also considered to be a moral virtue.  In fact, 
Aristotle treats practical wisdom as the “keystone of all virtue.”101  Ethical 
judgment ends in action for Aristotle through the process of practical 
wisdom, or “phronesis.”102  For Aristotle, the moral virtues are those 
characteristics of the soul that allow us to desire and to select good ends.103  
But practical wisdom is the virtue that allows us to take aim and decide on 
a course of action to achieve these good ends.104  Practical wisdom enables 
one to act at the time “when one should,” “in the way one should,” and “for 
the reasons one should.”105 
In Aristotle’s view, the gap between priority rules and action is 
bridged by the virtue of practical wisdom.106  Arriving at the ability to 
know and recognize what is good cannot be accomplished without this 
intellectual virtue.  All choice involves consideration and deliberation of 
the alternatives.107  Practical wisdom is the ability to deliberate well—to 
recognize and perceive proper ends, and then to select those means that are 
likely to achieve such ends.108  Deliberation toward any end is cleverness; 
deliberation toward a good end is practical wisdom.109 
 
 98 Also focusing on the integrity of an individual’s internal self assessment, Gabriele 
Taylor has argued that hypocrisy and self deception are two specialized vices of dishonesty, 
because they allow an individual to deceive himself about his authentic constitution.  
Gabriele Taylor, Integrity, in THE ARISTOTELEAN SOCIETY 143, 144–47 (Supp. LV 1981).  
 99 Shaffer, supra note 44, at 33. 
 100 See Loder, supra note 28, at 856. 
 101 MACINTYRE, supra note 70, at 74. 
 102 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 5, at 179–80; id. at 455 (word list); see Solum, 
supra note 60, at 1385. 
 103 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 13, at 189.  
 104 Id. bk. VI, ch. 12, at 187. 
    105 Id. bk. II, ch 6, at 117. 
 106 Id. bk. VI, ch. 13, at 188. 
 107 ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1922, 1942 
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).  
 108 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 13, at 189; see DANIEL MARK NELSON, THE 
PRIORITY OF PRUDENCE 42–43 (1992); PRIOR, supra note 49, at 178. 
 109 Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, in VIRTUE ETHICS 105, 109 (Stephen Darwall ed., 
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Aristotle recognized that in certain situations the moral virtues may be 
in conflict (for example, courage may point in one direction and 
temperance in another).110  However, Aristotle believed that practical 
wisdom was the key to discerning a proper course of action in those 
instances where the virtues might conflict.111  What might be cowardice in 
one situation might be courage in another.  For Aristotle “[t]he virtues of 
character are unified through practical wisdom.”112  “Virtuous action 
cannot be specified without reference to the judgment of a prudent 
man.”113  This emphasis on context is distinctly Aristotelian.114  To be a 
virtuous person requires “sensitivity to the salient features of [particular] 
situations,” and not merely the capacity to apply or follow explicit rules.115 
Practical wisdom involves a three-step process—deliberation, 
 
2003). 
 110 Crisp, supra note 33, at 17.  St. Thomas Aquinas, unlike Aristotle, believed that the 
natural virtues were unified.  Id.  Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes Aquinas’s account of the 
unity of the virtues, and suggests that different ethical outcomes are possible for two 
virtuous actors.  A conflict in virtues does not just come from defect in character.  
MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 197.  It is possible for two virtuous actors to apply practical 
wisdom and to come to two different conclusions, although frequently practical wisdom will 
lead them to view competing claims the same way in context.  Id. at 200. 
 111 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 13, at 189; see also Lorie M. Graham, 
Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 15 (1995) (discussing the 
need to integrate practical reason to attain complete virtue). 
 112 JACOBS, supra note 66, at 124. 
 113 MACINTYRE, supra note 70, at 66. 
 114 Aristotle recognized that one person’s virtue is not commensurate with another’s, 
and that some people are more capable than others.  The degree of the strength in each one’s 
life “depends on the gifts each one has.”  Keenan, supra note 49, at 122.  Thus “to the extent 
one strives as best one can, one is good.”  Id.  Each person may pray for the absolute good 
to come within his grasp, but what he should be actively pursuing is the good he can obtain.  
See Bodeus, supra note 68, at 68.  Modern virtue theorists such as Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Rosalind Hursthouse use these parts of Aristotelian theory to support relativistic claims on 
moral reasoning.  See Rosalind Hursthouse, Normative Virtue Ethics, in HOW SHOULD ONE 
LIVE?, supra note 33, at 19, 35.  Modern virtue ethicists thus admit the possibility of cultural 
relativism—for example, different cultures have different notions of truthfulness.  See 
Robert Wachbroit, A Genealogy of Virtues, 92 YALE L.J. 564, 576 (1983).  MacIntyre, like 
Wachbroit, recognized that different societies emphasize different virtues over time.  
Virtues may vary across traditions, but within traditions virtue theory could lead individuals 
to moral right.  See MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 193 (noting that virtuous “practices . . . 
might flourish in societies with very different codes; what they could not do is flourish in 
societies in which virtues were not valued”). 
 115 Crisp, supra note 33, at 17.  Aristotle did not argue that every moral decision 
involves intense intellectual effort and a long period of deliberation.  On the contrary, 
Aristotle believed that a person of the highest level of moral achievement often could 
deliberate quickly, because he is able to operate more from habit than anguished self 
examination.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 9, at 184. 
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judgment, and decision.116  It is a dialectic rather than a purely deductive 
approach.117  Individuals who possess the virtue of practical wisdom are 
reflective;118 they are willing and able to deliberate well about what it 
means to pursue the good in a particular circumstance.119  A person who is 
good at deliberation combines both compassion (the power of generating 
feelings for potential outcomes, even those that affect others rather than 
himself) and detachment (the power to moderate or confine those feeling in 
balancing interests and making decisions between alternatives).120  The 
prudent lawyer is able both to identify the salient features of particular 
situations, and then to synthesize the multiplicity of concerns at stake.121 
In The Common Law Tradition, Karl Llewellyn argued that a judge’s 
habits guide his method of interpretation and judicial reasoning.122  In 
assessing what it means to be an impartial jurist, Llewellyn described the 
following attitude: “an idea of effort, of self denying labor, toward 
patience, toward understanding sympathy, toward [a] quest for wisdom in 
the result.”123  This depiction of the judicial thought process was 
essentially a celebration of the Aristotelian virtue of practical wisdom.124  
In many of their tasks, prosecutors perform quasi-judicial functions that 
require them to step out of a purely adversarial role.125  That is, in certain 
areas of decisionmaking we expect prosecutors—like judges—to be 
impartial in assessing the propriety of potential courses of action, and to 
come to a decision only after careful and balanced deliberation about the 
public interest.126 
 
 116 Perkins, supra note 49, at 200. 
 117 Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, Introduction to ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS 1, 2–3 
(Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980).  
 118 Loder, supra note 28, at 854. 
 119 CYNDI BANKS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 235–40 (2004); see also Scott FitzGibbon, 
Marriage and the Ethics of Office, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 89, 107 
(2004) (arguing that choice, consideration, and deliberation can only properly arise from a 
self-governing character).   
 120 ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 74 (1993). 
 121 In his seminal 1993 book, Anthony Kronman lamented that good judgment is a trait 
of character no longer nurtured by the legal profession, either in the way we educate law 
students, the way we mentor and develop young lawyers in practice, or the way we structure 
and organize law firms.  Id. at 165. 
 122 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 53 (1960). 
 123 Id. at 47. 
 124 KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 217. 
 125 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.1, at 759 (1986) 
(recognizing that the prosecutor’s dual role of convicting the guilty and protecting the 
innocent “leaves the office much nearer that of a judicial officer than that of partisan 
advocate”); Fisher, supra note 12, at 236–38. 
 126 See Maria Collins Warren, Ethical Prosecution: A Philosophical Field Guide, 41 
WASHBURN L.J. 269, 270 (2002). 
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How does an emphasis on practical wisdom differ from the so-called 
“new casuistry” approach to legal ethics?  Casuistry has been defined as a 
“particularized, context-driven method” of ethical decisionmaking,127 
whereby one extrapolates from the principles underlying an ethical rule, 
and then determines the right course of action in gray areas by giving full 
consideration to the details of the situation and the motives and 
circumstances of the various actors involved.128  But as proponents of new 
casuistry recognize, the proper exercise of casuistry requires not only 
attention to and reflection on the particulars of a concrete ethical dilemma, 
but also a form of expertise.  Casuistry is not just going with your best 
“hunch” or intuition.  Those who are successful at casuistry as a form of 
moral reasoning are those that have developed the wisdom necessary to 
develop considered moral judgments.129  Casuistry and virtue theory thus 
share an emphasis on the importance of practical wisdom and experience. 
Where casuistry and virtue theory diverge, however, is on the issue of what 
personal attributes of the decisionmaker apart from wisdom (and perhaps 
the other intellectual virtues such as the ability to listen attentively and to 
reason) are necessary to considered moral judgment.  Unlike casuistry, 
virtue ethics looks inward and emphasizes the importance of the good 
character of the decisionmaker.130  For Aristotle and other virtue ethicists, 
a person’s character is akin to the muscles of an athlete; successful 
performance in any particular endeavor depends not only on attention to the 
external circumstances of the contest, but also on conditioning and 
development of the inner self. 
I will now turn to the three ethical questions I posed at the beginning 
of this Article.  A close scrutiny of the context in which such decisions are 
made can help explain why real life pressures often obscure a commitment 
to ethical judgment.  In the criminal justice system, prosecutors must 
contend with multiple actors with competing claims in the drama—
including the victim, police officers, the defendant, and other witnesses.  
The prosecutor must also maintain good working relationships with 
numerous stakeholders in the system—including the judge, other court 
personnel, law enforcement agencies, and informants.  Prosecutors face 
 
 127 Paul R. Tremblay, The New Casuistry, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 492 (1999). 
 128 See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical 
Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1697–98 (1991) (“Ethical systems emerge from this 
network of relationships when we seek to resolve and explain our resolutions of the 
quotidian dilemmas that we encounter in the complex, nuanced, temporal context in which 
they arise.  This ethical theory, then, responds to the experiences central to daily personal 
situations and requires reflection on such situations to develop moral consciousness.”). 
 129 Tremblay, supra note 127, at 522. 
 130 For a further discussion of the differences between casuistry and virtue ethics, see 
infra note 293 and accompanying text. 
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external political pressure from a concerned public and the press, and 
internal pressures from a boss who is typically an elected public official.  
Dynamic pressures within the criminal justice system also affect a 
prosecutor’s ability to do his job properly; daunting workloads and under-
funded offices typically allow prosecutors little time to make nuanced 
decisions in particular cases.  Finally, every decision is riddled with 
epistemological problems; although prosecutors must make factual 
assessments quickly and constantly, they seldom have all the information 
needed to make difficult choices.  In light of these myriad tensions and 
limitations, I will demonstrate that rules of professional responsibility do 
not and cannot direct moral action in any of the three complex areas I will 
describe.  However, a renewed focus on virtue (and particularly the virtues 
of fairness, courage, honesty, and prudence) can provide meaningful 
guidance for conscientious prosecutors striving to do what is right. 
II.  THE PROBLEM OF THE TURNCOAT ACCOMPLICE 
 Assistant United States Attorney Thomas Marks is prosecuting three 
individuals charged with distributing a large quantity of cocaine (five 
kilograms) and conspiracy.  The defendants were arrested after a so-
called “reverse sting” operation, whereby an undercover officer sold 
five kilograms of cocaine to the defendants for $75,000.  When one of 
the defendants handed the undercover officer the money and took 
possession of the cocaine, the undercover officer gave the surveillance 
team a signal, and they moved in to effectuate the arrests of all three 
individuals. 
 Under the federal sentencing guidelines, each defendant is facing a 
minimum mandatory term of imprisonment of ten years.  Each 
defendant played a somewhat different role in the transaction and the 
negotiations leading up to the exchange.  Defendant #1 appeared to law 
enforcement to be the primary ringleader of the enterprise; each of the 
meetings to discuss the transaction occurred at his used car business, 
and he played the largest role in negotiating the price, quantity, and 
other terms of the sale.  According to DEA agents and their informants, 
Defendant #1 is the leader of an organization that moves approximately 
twenty kilograms of cocaine per month and then launders the proceeds 
through the car dealership.  Defendant #2 appeared to be another key 
player in the enterprise, acting as Defendant #1’s lieutenant.  During 
negotiations for the sale of cocaine he made several inculpatory 
statements (captured on tape) indicating his knowledge of the cocaine 
business and his plans to package and resell the drugs.  Defendant #2 
has no prior criminal record.  Defendant #3 acted primarily as a 
lookout during the transaction.  The government clearly has enough to 
convict Defendant #3 of drug trafficking on an accomplice theory (he 
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drove the other two defendants to the scene of each prior meeting, and 
on the date of the sale frisked the undercover officer when he walked 
into the used car business and then stood guard by the door).  However, 
the DEA does not think Defendant #3 was a substantial player in the 
enterprise. 
 Defendant #1 and Defendant #2 have no prior criminal records.  
Defendant # 3 has a significant prior record of violent crime—including 
convictions for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, domestic 
violence, firearm possession, and stalking.  He has served two separate 
terms in state prison. 
 The lawyer for Defendant #2 approaches AUSA Marks and informs 
the prosecutor that his client is willing to testify against Defendants #1 
and #3 in exchange for a dismissal of the distribution count and a 
recommendation of a short jail term on the conspiracy count. 
 Should the prosecutor pursue such a deal? 
Given that well over ninety percent of criminal cases are resolved by 
plea bargains,131 it is somewhat surprising that plea bargaining in criminal 
cases is almost completely unregulated as a matter of professional 
responsibility.  On the particular subject of granting leniency to a 
codefendant in exchange for cooperation, neither the text of Model Rule 
3.8 nor the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards provide any direction 
whatsoever to conscientious prosecutors searching for guidance.  The 
scholarly literature is similarly unhelpful.  While much has been written 
both on the repercussions to a defendant when the government enters into a 
cooperation agreement with an accomplice witness132 and the procedures 
that must be followed,133 the more fundamental issue of when it is ethically 
appropriate to grant leniency in exchange for cooperation has received little 
academic attention.134 
One might legitimately ask whether cooperation agreements present 
an “ethical” issue at all.  Assuming that an accomplice seeks to obtain 
leniency by agreeing to testify against a codefendant, the decision of 
whether or not to allow him to do so certainly implicates issues of trial 
strategy.  Will the accomplice’s testimony be believed by the jury?  Does 
 
 131 See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 233 (2003). 
 132 See, e.g., Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 40–57 (1992).  
 133 See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:” Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, 
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129, 1141 (2004) (outlining 
safeguards that must be followed after reaching a cooperation agreement). 
 134 See Samuel J. Levine, Taking Prosecutorial Ethics Seriously: A Consideration of the 
Prosecutor’s Ethical Obligation to “Seek Justice” in a Comparative Analytical Framework, 
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1337, 1350 (2004). 
CASSIDY_FINALREAD 11/13/2006  7:18:19 PM 
120 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  [VOL. 82: 2 
the government need the testimony to firm up its case against the remaining 
defendants?  Will it likely force a plea from the principal defendant, thus 
sparing the government the expense of a trial?  These are all strategic 
questions related principally to the issue of whether bargained-for 
testimony will make the government’s case stronger against other 
defendants. 
The decision whether to enter into a cooperation agreement with an 
accomplice witness also implicates issues of public policy.  How dangerous 
and morally culpable is the accomplice?  Would public safety be 
compromised if he or she were spared jail time in exchange for 
cooperation?  When the prosecutor makes an agreement with an 
accomplice in exchange for testimony, he is making an implicit decision 
that the societal benefits to be achieved from convicting a more culpable 
actor outweigh the costs associated with granting leniency to a confederate.  
Climbing “up the chain” of a criminal enterprise by using a smaller fish to 
catch a bigger fish may serve the public interest by assuring retribution 
against the most serious actor.  “If you are going to try the devil, you have 
to go to hell to get your witnesses.”135 
But does striking a deal with an accomplice in exchange for 
cooperation implicate the ethics of the prosecutor?  I submit that that it 
does, for at least three reasons.  First, offering leniency to an accomplice 
witness in exchange for cooperation gives the witness a powerful incentive 
to fabricate his testimony in order to curry favor with the government.136  
Accomplices have a natural incentive to minimize their own involvement 
in the enterprise and to exaggerate the responsibility of others.137  Offering 
them a “deal” in exchange for cooperation against cohorts magnifies this 
incentive, because the accomplice implicitly understands that he is being 
granted leniency only because the government believes that he is less 
culpable than other defendants.  The witness is thereafter subtly coaxed—if 
 
 135 State v. Sims, 588 S.E.2d 55, 64 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
 136 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth 
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 932 (1999).  In United States v. 
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), 
the Tenth Circuit ruled that a promise not to prosecute an accomplice in exchange for his 
cooperation against others was an offer of a thing “of value” in exchange for testimony in 
violation of the federal anti-gratuity statute.  Id. at 1350–51.  “The judicial process is tainted 
and justice cheapened when factual testimony is purchased, whether with leniency or 
money.”  Id. at 1347.  This ruling was later reversed by an en banc opinion of the Tenth 
Circuit, in which the court concluded that Congress did not intend to limit the “sovereign 
prerogative” of the government in making plea bargains by using the term “whoever” in the 
federal anti-gratuity statute.  Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1311. 
 137 See Steven M. Cohen, What is True? Perspectives of a Former Prosecutor, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 817, 822 (2002). 
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not explicitly coached—into relating a version of facts consistent with that 
view of the criminal hierarchy.138  This implicates the prosecutor’s 
obligation of candor to the tribunal, and his responsibility not to put a 
witness on the stand when the prosecutor knows or it is obvious that the 
witness will perjure himself.139 
Second, in certain circumstances it may be fundamentally immoral to 
offer a favorable deal to an accomplice solely due to his access to critical 
information.  Where the accomplice has assisted in a heinous act (e.g., a 
brutal child murder), does any amount of cooperation against confederates 
warrant a reduction in the deserved punishment?  Allowing a defendant to 
“buy” his way out of punishment with future cooperation may in certain 
circumstances undermine the retributive and deterrent purposes of the 
criminal law. 
Finally, pegging punishment to cooperation may also lead to situations 
where codefendants who are more deeply involved in the criminal 
enterprise (and therefore likely to have greater access to crucial 
information) are treated more favorably than lower-level accomplices, 
notwithstanding that the mid-level-player-turned-witness is more morally 
blameworthy.140  If we accept the premise that bargained-for outcomes in 
criminal cases should at least bear some relationship to the defendant’s 
level of culpability, cooperation deals at times can lead to morally skewed 
results.141 
Notwithstanding these ethical implications of accomplice bargaining, 
there are very few systemic checks on a prosecutor’s discretionary decision 
to offer leniency in exchange for cooperation.  The Supreme Court has 
taken the position that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is 
not violated where the government uses bargained-for testimony from an 
accomplice witness at a criminal trial.142  The Court adheres to the view 
 
 138 See Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the Enforcement of Ethical 
Rules Can Minimize the Dangers of Prosecutorial Leniency and Immunity Deals, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 875, 884 (2002). 
 139 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3, 3.4 (2004). 
 140 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 199, 212 (1993) (citing cooperation paradox with minimum mandatory penalties, 
which can lead to harsh penalties for relatively minor players with no information to offer 
the government). 
 141 See, e.g., Marcia Chambers, When Law Prevents Justice, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 11, 1991, 
at 13.  
 142 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227 (1941).  However, some circuits have taken 
the position that due process safeguards may be violated where the prosecutor conditions an 
offer of leniency on testimony leading to the conviction of a named individual.  See United 
States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1300–01 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 
192, 199 (1st Cir. 1985).  See generally United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 
313 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing per se rule of exclusion of testimony where the government 
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that three primary safeguards in this area—disclosure by the prosecutor to 
defense counsel of any promises, rewards, and inducements made to the 
witness,143 the right of defense counsel to cross-examine the witness for 
bias,144 and the judge’s obligation to instruct the jury that they should 
evaluate an accomplice’s testimony with caution145—are together 
sufficient to protect the defendant from potential unfairness. 
Democratic processes similarly provide very little check on a 
prosecutor’s decision to “flip” an accomplice.  Most prosecutors on the 
state and local level are elected officials.146  While the news media may 
sometimes question the wisdom and fairness of deals made with 
accomplice witnesses,147 the public does not seem to react to such news 
accounts with alarm or dismay, at least at the voting booth.  It is 
exceptionally rare in this country for an incumbent prosecutor to be voted 
out of office.148  The electorate may assume that cooperation agreements 
are inappropriate subjects for lay scrutiny, because the prosecutor has 
access to behind-the-scenes information not available to the average 
citizen.  Or, high-profile convictions that follow accomplice bargaining 
may foster public perception of prosecutorial competence and zeal. 
On the question of “how much” of a discount to award to a 
cooperating accomplice, courts too are reluctant to intrude on what they 
perceive to be the prosecutor’s executive prerogative,149 notwithstanding 
that ultimate sentencing authority rests with the court.150  Issues of the 
value of cooperation and the importance of the testimony to law 
enforcement objectives are considered particularly ill-suited to judicial 
review.151  Where the government seeks to dismiss some or all of the 
 
compensated the witness). 
 143 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972). 
 144 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 311 (1966). 
 145 Id. at 312. 
 146 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 533–34 (2001). 
 147 See, e.g., J.M. Lawrence, Hit Man May Hit Street: Prosecutors Go Easy on 
Martorano, BOSTON HERALD, May 14, 2004, at 4; Harvey A. Silverglate, Op-Ed., 
Disturbing Steps by Prosecutors, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2004, at A15. 
 148 See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction 
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 152–53 (2004) (noting that incumbent 
prosecutors seeking reelection in this country are often unopposed, and that “the public’s 
capacity to hold prosecutors accountable for their actions has thus become more fiction than 
fact”). 
 149 See The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594, 603 (1878); United States v. Gonzalez, 58 
F.3d 459, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 150 See Cohen, supra note 137, at 820. 
 151 See H. Richard Uviller, No Sauce for the Gander: Valuable Consideration for 
Helpful Testimony from Tainted Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 
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charges against an accomplice as a reward for favorable testimony, courts 
are relatively powerless to deny such a motion.152  Where the government 
offers to recommend a reduced sentence on the crimes charged against the 
accomplice, it is rare for a judge to second guess the prosecutor’s discretion 
and deny the requested leniency.153  As one commentator has noted about 
the federal sentencing system, “Congress has authorized and the 
[sentencing] commission has implemented, a system in which the 
determination of whether a ‘substantial assistance’ discount is to be granted 
is left solely to the unreviewed discretion of the prosecutor.”154 
Attorney conduct rules also provide little constraint in this area.  State 
rules of professional responsibility in effect in most jurisdictions preclude a 
lawyer from paying a “fact witness” (i.e., a nonexpert) a fee for testifying, 
or conferring a reward on a witness based on the content of his 
testimony.155  But prosecutors are savvy enough to avoid these direct 
 
779–80 (2002). 
 152 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), “leave of court” is required before 
the United States Attorney may dismiss an indictment.  In Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 
22 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that this leave of court requirement altered the 
common law rule that prosecutors have unfettered authority to issue a nolle prosequi; 
however, the Court ruled that this requirement was designed primarily to protect the 
defendant against “prosecutorial harassment,” such as charging, dismissing, and recharging.  
Id. at 29 n.15.  The Court in Rinaldi expressly reserved judgment on the issue of whether a 
trial court may ever deny an uncontested motion to dismiss.  Id.  However, several circuit 
courts subsequent to Rinaldi have ruled that a district court may deny an uncontested to 
motion to dismiss under Rule 48(a) only where dismissal is clearly contrary to manifest 
public interest, such as where “the prosecutor appears motivated by bribery, animus towards 
the victim, or a desire to attend a social event rather than trial.”  In re Richards, 213 F.3d 
773, 787 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 1981)); 
see also In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2003) (reviewing authorities and 
stating that no federal appellate court has ever upheld a district court’s denial of an 
uncontested motion to dismiss). 
 153 See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 125–28 (1994). 
 154 David Boerner, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 JUDICATURE 
196, 200 (1995).  Under the federal sentencing guidelines, a judge may sentence an offender 
below the designated sentencing range for a particular offense if the prosecutor files a 
motion acknowledging that the defendant “provided substantial assistance” in the 
investigation or prosecution of another.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 
(2005).  It is rare for the federal courts to refuse a downward departure after the government 
has filed a substantial assistance motion.  See United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63 (6th 
Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Nicholson, 231 F.3d 445, 451 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(affirming the district court’s downward departure despite the defendant’s nearly 
contemptuous behavior). 
 155 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(c) (1980) (“A lawyer shall not 
pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon 
the content of his testimony or the outcome of the case.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
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prohibitions, by conditioning an offer of leniency on the witness’s 
divulgence of truthful information and cooperation with the investigation 
and prosecution of others, rather than on the precise content of future 
testimony.156 
If there is any ethical check on this aspect of prosecutorial discretion, 
it must be gleaned from the “minister of justice” admonition of Rule 3.8.  
Yet this directive arguably may point in opposite directions with respect to 
cooperating accomplices, depending on the facts of the case and the context 
of the bargaining.  Justice may demand that the “big fish” be convicted; if 
the accomplice’s testimony allows the government to break a difficult case, 
then perhaps it has promoted, rather than impeded, justice.  After all, the 
prosecutor cannot prevent the act that has already been committed; perhaps 
the most he can do is assure that all responsible parties are brought to 
justice for their roles in the enterprise.157  However, justice may also 
demand that the cooperating accomplice pay a sufficient price for his 
misdeeds; granting too great a discount to him in exchange for cooperation 
may result in the accomplice escaping appropriate punishment.  Overly 
generous cooperation agreements may also impede justice in the case of 
remaining codefendants by promoting perjured testimony at their upcoming 
trials. 
Every decision whether to “flip” an indicted co-conspirator requires a 
contextual assessment of the strengths and weakness of the case, the 
relative culpability of the codefendants, the credibility of the accomplice 
and whether his testimony can be corroborated, the prior criminal records 
of both the accomplice and the other codefendants, and a balancing of law 
enforcement priorities and resources.  The U.S. Attorney’s Manual—a 
nonbinding policy manual for federal prosecutors issued by the Department 
of Justice—summarizes the factors that a prosecutor should consider in 
determining “whether a person’s cooperation may be necessary to the 
public interest.”158  Section 9-27-620 of this manual suggests that a 
prosecutor should weigh all relevant considerations, including:  
1. The importance of the investigation or prosecution to an effective program of 
law enforcement;  
2. The value of the person’s cooperation to the investigation or prosecution; and  
3. The person’s relative culpability in connection with the offense or offenses 
 
CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2004); id. cmt. 3 (“The common law rule in most jurisdictions is that it 
is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying . . . .”); see also United States 
v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1313–14 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmts. 1, 3). 
 156 See Saavedra v. Thomas, No. 96-2113, 1997 WL 768288, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 12, 
1997); Cassidy, supra note 133, at 1137–38. 
 157 See Levine, supra note 134, at 1366. 
 158 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION § 9-27.620 (1993). 
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being investigated or prosecuted and his/her history with respect to criminal 
activity.159 
While this summary is a useful guidepost, obviously it would be both 
ineffectual and unenforceable as an ethical norm, because highly subjective 
determinations such as relative value and relative culpability are each 
components of the overall equation. 
These are the sort of difficult decisions that even the most seasoned 
prosecutors lose sleep over, particularly in cases involving violent crimes 
such as murder or rape.160  Although most cooperation decisions are 
subject to internal checks within a prosecutor’s office—such as obtaining a 
supervisor’s approval before a substantial assistance motion may be filed or 
an indictment may be dismissed161—these safeguards only bump an 
individual discretionary decision to a higher level of scrutiny; they do not 
eliminate prosecutorial discretion altogether.  Whether any prosecutor—
trial attorney or supervisor—appropriately recognizes and synthesizes the 
multifarious factors at stake is dependent upon the internal moral compass 
of the decisionmaker.  That, in turn, depends on the presence or absence of 
virtue. 
What might the virtues teach us about an ethical approach to this 
dilemma?  First, a prosecutor must have courage to hold out for an 
appropriate disposition from any accomplice who seeks to leverage 
cooperation in exchange for leniency.  Courage is the virtue that reinforces 
an actor’s will to take appropriate action notwithstanding potential adverse 
consequences.162  Cooperation deals are usually commenced with the 
codefendant providing a nonbinding “proffer” of information to police 
officers, which reveals information in the codefendant’s possession which 
 
 159 Id. § 9.27.620. 
 160 See Andrea Estes, Black Leaders: Hit Man Deal Shows System Favors Whites, 
BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 29, 1999, at 16 (discussing how U.S. Attorney agonized over 
whether to make cooperation agreement with mafia hitman); see also Laurie L. Levenson, 
Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 559 (1999) (explaining that difficulties in exercising discretion 
come “in evaluating those factors that are not defined by statute, including the severity of 
the crime, the defendant’s role in the crime, the defendant’s past and possible future 
cooperation, injury to the victim, complexity in trying the case and the likelihood of 
success”). 
 161 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to All 
Fed. Prosecutors, Regarding Policy on Charging of Criminal Defendants (Sept. 22, 2003), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm [hereinafter 
Ashcroft Memorandum].  The Ashcroft Memorandum requires federal prosecutors to charge 
the “most serious, readily provable offense” committed by the defendant, subject to certain 
exceptions (including where “substantial assistance” has been provided by the target and 
prior approval of a designated supervisor has been obtained).  Id.   
 162 KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 145. 
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may be useful to the government’s investigation.163  In exchange for this 
proffer, the government typically promises not to use any information 
obtained during the proffer interview against the codefendant, should future 
negotiations break down.164  After the proffer is completed, the prosecutor 
then evaluates the accomplice’s information and begins negotiations with 
defense counsel about what consideration will be offered by the 
government in exchange for the accomplice’s testimony.  The defense 
attorney’s opening demand might be wholly inappropriate given the nature 
of the crime and the magnitude of his client’s involvement (e.g., “My guy 
will not testify unless you dismiss the trafficking charge and let him plead 
guilty to conspiracy with a suspended sentence.”).  A prosecutor must have 
the courage to say no and mean it; that is, he must be willing to try the case 
without the accomplice’s cooperation, rather than obtaining his assistance 
at an exorbitant price.  Only when a defendant accurately senses that the 
prosecutor is willing to risk an acquittal by going to trial against all of the 
codefendants on less than airtight evidence does the defendant have any 
incentive to agree to a disposition of the charges on reasonable terms. 
This problem also implicates the virtue of honesty.  First, any reduced 
charge which is negotiated with the accomplice should fairly reflect the 
gravity of the offense.  Allowing the accomplice to plead guilty to a wholly 
artificial charge gives the public a false sense both of what occurred on the 
street and what is occurring in the court.  For example, a defendant charged 
with trafficking in five kilograms of cocaine might be allowed to plead 
guilty to conspiracy to traffic in cocaine if his cooperation is deemed 
critical to the government’s case.  But should that same defendant be 
allowed to plead guilty to possession of cocaine for personal use?  If the 
prosecutor is to be accountable at all to the public, plea agreements should 
not be fashioned to allow a defendant to plead guilty to a crime which is 
wholly inconsistent with the truth.  Factual, rather than fanciful, 
dispositions are important not only for public confidence, but also to 
support the work of other stakeholders in the criminal justice system.  
Probation records enable law enforcement officials to accurately assess an 
individual’s level of dangerousness should the same defendant later be a 
suspect in another criminal matter.  Rap sheets which contain bogus 
dispositions are of little use to police officers, probation officers, or judges 
in later proceedings.  For each of these reasons, the U.S. Attorney’s Manual 
appropriately emphasizes that reduced charges against a cooperating 
witness in federal court should bear some reasonable relationship “to the 
nature and extent of [the defendant’s] criminal conduct” and should have 
 
 163 See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and 
Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003). 
 164 Id. 
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“an adequate factual basis.”165 
Honesty is critical to this decision in another important respect.  A 
virtuous prosecutor will be cautious about giving the accomplice too great 
an incentive to lie, and will build safeguards into the plea bargaining 
process to protect against perjury.  One way prosecutors typically attempt 
to promote truth rather than falsity is to corroborate key details of the 
accomplice’s version of events with physical evidence, or with testimony 
from nonbiased witnesses.  In the absence of some such corroboration, the 
prosecutor cannot be confident that the accomplice is not falsely 
implicating others in exchange for leniency.166  Of course, this insistence 
on corroboration presents an anomaly; if every detail of the codefendant’s 
version of events could be independently corroborated, there would be no 
need to bargain for his cooperation in the first instance.  In most situations, 
the value of an accomplice’s testimony increases in inverse proportion to 
the information already in possession of the prosecutor; that is, accomplice 
cooperation is needed precisely because there are certain facts that cannot 
be proven without his testimony.167  Nevertheless, one of the key factors 
the prosecutor must assess in determining whether to enter into a 
cooperation agreement with an accomplice is the reliability of the witness’s 
story.  This can only be tested if some aspects of the accomplice’s version 
of events are corroborated in important respects.168  In performing this 
credibility assessment, the prosecutor must view one of his primary 
responsibilities as acting as an agent of the truth. 
A prosecutor striving for honesty can also structure the plea 
negotiations with the accomplice in a manner that promotes truth rather 
than falsehood.  One common way to promote honesty is to condition the 
government’s offer of leniency on the accomplice’s obligation to tell the 
truth, and to give the government an express escape clause under any 
written agreement if the accomplice commits perjury.169  The witness then 
appreciates that if he lies on the witness stand his deal with the government 
is canceled, and he may be punished not only for the offenses originally 
charged but also for the crime of perjury.  Of course this check, while 
necessary, is not in and of itself sufficient to prevent accomplice 
fabrication.  Perjury by an accomplice might be difficult to detect and 
prove; actors enmeshed in a criminal enterprise might be able to lie 
 
 165 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 158, § 9-27.430. 
 166 Many states have statutes in effect prohibiting the conviction of a defendant solely 
on the basis of uncorroborated testimony from an accomplice.  See Hughes, supra note 132, 
at 31.   
 167 Cohen, supra note 137, at 822. 
 168 See John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion—A Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 
174, 183 (1965). 
 169 Simons, supra note 163, at 17–19. 
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convincingly precisely because they know better than law enforcement 
officers which facts are independently verifiable and which are not.170 
Other methods of structuring the plea negotiations can also help to 
promote truthful testimony.  First, the prosecutor during the negotiation 
process should take care not to “horseshed” the witness into relating a 
particular version of events consistent with the prosecutor’s theory of the 
case.  Where the government withholds promises of leniency during initial 
interviews with the accomplice (e.g., “I don’t believe you,” “You are 
lying,” “I know your partners distributed more cocaine than that,” etc.), the 
prosecutor is sending a message that a deal will be struck with the 
accomplice only when he relates a version of facts more inculpatory of 
codefendants.  This can lead to fabrication by desperate accomplices 
looking to curry favor with the government.  Professor Ellen Yaroshefksy 
interviewed twenty-five former prosecutors on the subject of accomplice 
cooperation, and concluded that many prosecutors and criminal 
investigators approach witness interviews with rigid theories of guilt, 
causing them to 1) signal to cooperating witnesses what testimony is 
expected, and 2) fail to dig deeply for inconsistencies that might rebut this 
preconceived theory.171  Due to the overwhelming pressure on an 
accomplice to please and to conform, perhaps the spirit—if not the express 
text—of the Model Code’s antiperjury provision172 should be construed to 
prohibit a prosecutor from affirmatively coaching an accomplice witness 
during proffer sessions.173 
The prosecutor can also promote honesty by ensuring that defense 
counsel for the codefendants has the tools necessary to cross-examine any 
accomplice in order to expose bias or fabrication.  This requires 1) having 
police officers or agents memorialize interviews with accomplices in 
writing, in order to allow for discovery of the witness’s statements as they 
evolve and change over time;174 and 2) disclosing all promises of leniency 
 
 170 Yaroshefsky, supra note 136, at 921. 
 171 Id. at 952–55. 
 172 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2004) (“A lawyer shall not . . . counsel 
or assist a witness to testify falsely . . . .”). 
 173 Ross, supra note 138, at 886–88. 
 174 Id. at 888.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000) (obliging federal prosecutor to 
disclose at trial all written statements made or adopted by witness, or all “substantially 
verbatim” records of oral statements made contemporaneously with the interview), with 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999) (requiring prosecutor to turn over prior 
inconsistent statements by witness, whether written or oral, if they are constitutionally 
material).  Many prosecutors discourage investigative agents from writing official reports of 
accomplice witness interviews during the early stage of the proffer process because they 
anticipate that the witness’s story will change over time and they do not want to create 
discoverable material.  John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1836 (2001).  Some courts are beginning to respond to such 
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to the accomplice witness, whether formal or informal, written or oral.175 
Fairness is also an important consideration that should motivate a 
virtuous prosecutor structuring plea negotiations with an accomplice 
witness.  I have already discussed issues of fairness with respect to the 
victim (in terms of the honest selection of charges against a cooperating 
accomplice) and with respect to those defendants who will proceed to trial 
(in terms of full disclosure of exculpatory Giglio material).  What about 
fairness to defendants who may want to cooperate with the government, but 
may have little useful information to provide?  One concern with 
prosecutorial discretion in this area is the so-called “cooperation paradox”; 
that is, defendants who are more deeply enmeshed in the criminal milieu 
may be better able to leverage leniency for themselves than lower-level 
players.176  Should a prosecutor enter into a deal with a mid-level player in 
exchange for his cooperation that results in the mid-level player serving 
less time in prison than a lower level player?  In the hypothetical posed at 
the beginning of this Part, would the prosecutor be fulfilling his obligation 
as a “minister of justice” if Defendant #2 (the “lieutenant”) served less time 
in prison than Defendant #3 (the “bodyguard”)?  Is the difference in their 
criminal records, coupled with the helpful testimony of the lieutenant, 
sufficient to justify such a disparity? 
This tension between equity among codefendants in particular cases 
and sentencing uniformity across cases with respect to similar crimes is 
particularly acute where the defendants are charged with offenses carrying 
a minimum mandatory sentence.  In those situations, for example, a federal 
judge has almost no discretion to impose a sentence on the defendant that is 
more lenient than the legislature has specified unless the defendant has 
provided substantial assistance.177  Suppose in my hypothetical that the 
 
intentional reticence in generating reports by requiring production of interview notes taken 
by law enforcement agents, whether or not they are formalized.  See United States v. 
Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (ordering discovery of government’s 
notes and summaries of statements made by cooperating witness during interviews); cf. 
Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547, 556 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that oral prior 
inconsistent statement during proffer session was impeachment material which should have 
been disclosed). 
 175 Cassidy, supra note 133, at 1171; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 
(1972) (indicating that due process requires disclosure of promises, rewards and 
inducements to government witnesses). 
 176 Schulhofer, supra note 140, at 211–13. 
 177 In federal court, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (Supp. III 2003) allows the judge to impose a 
sentence below the statutory minimum where the government makes a motion for a lower 
sentence on the basis of the defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of others.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2000) (giving judge discretion to 
deviate from minimum mandatory sentences called for in certain specified sections of the 
Controlled Substances Act even in the absence of substantial assistance if defendant has 
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bodyguard had no prior criminal record, and was willing to cooperate 
against his two codefendants but could provide little inside information 
about the organization not already available to the prosecution from other 
sources.  Does justice demand that Defendant #3 still go to jail for ten 
years? 
A virtuous prosecutor concerned about inequities flowing from the 
“cooperation paradox” has two possible options, both of which should be 
seriously considered in the interests of fairness.  First, a prosecutor who 
legitimately believes that a lower level defendant has in good faith 
submitted to an interview with law enforcement and attempted to 
cooperate, but simply has little useful information to provide, could 
nonetheless credit the defendant for “substantial assistance” 
notwithstanding that his information was of little practical use to the 
government.178  Ultimate determinations on cooperation should be made 
 
only minor criminal record, the crime did not involve the use of a weapon, violence or 
serious bodily injury, the defendant played a minor role in the organization, and the 
defendant truthfully provided to the government prior to sentencing “all information and 
evidence the defendant has concerning the offense”). 
 178 A government’s “substantial assistance” motion in the federal system does not give 
the defendant a right to a downward departure.  This motion is merely a precondition to a 
judge exercising discretion to depart from the sentencing guidelines.  The ultimate decision 
of whether to depart and by how much to depart rests with the sentencing judge.  See United 
States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 429–30 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Damer, 910 F.2d 
1239, 1241 (5th Cir. 1990).  For examples of situations where federal prosecutors have filed 
a substantial assistance motion and the trial court has nonetheless refused to allow a 
downward departure, see United States v. Busekros, 264 F.3d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(refusing to review ruling that defendant did not provide government “with any useful 
information”); United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that 
sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in declaring that it was “not at all convinced” 
that willingness to testify against others if necessary was sufficient to warrant a substantial 
assistance departure).  Professors Nagel and Schulhofer have criticized the wide latitude 
given to prosecutors in determining whether a defendant has provided substantial assistance, 
because this decision allows for biased judgments that may undercut the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines’ goal of uniformity: 
The problem with such equity judgments is that they are made by individual 
prosecutors without regard to the nationally set sentencing rules, thereby 
introducing sentencing disparity and compromising the uniformity and certainty 
goals of the guidelines.  Further, such individually made equity judgments open 
the door to race, gender, and social-class bias, notwithstanding the good intentions 
of individual AUSAs hoping to “save” sympathetic defendants. 
Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of 
Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 501, 535–36 (1992).  My argument here is that the inevitable tension between 
uniformity among defendants across the system and fairness to individuals in particular 
cases militates in favor of some discretion.  See Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial 
Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft Memorandum’s Curtailment of the 
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based on the defendant’s degree of involvement in the criminal enterprise 
and his willingness to assist in the investigation of others, not on mere 
access to information.  Access to information is a double-edged sword that 
points as much toward aggravation as toward mitigation in terms of 
culpability.  Whether the prosecutor can conscientiously represent to the 
court that the defendant has provided substantial assistance should turn on 
the cooperating defendant’s efforts and good faith.  If the government fairly 
perceives that during a proffer session an accomplice was feigning 
ignorance in order to protect others, then a substantial assistance departure 
would not be warranted. 
Even where a lower-level defendant has not provided substantial 
assistance to the government, prosecutors striving for fairness may 
nonetheless structure their sentencing recommendations with respect to all 
of the defendants in a way that attempts to avoid inequity.  Where the 
charges do not implicate a mandatory sentence, the prosecutor has 
flexibility to craft equitable sentencing recommendations for all defendants.  
Where the indictment charges an offense carrying a minimum mandatory 
sentence, concerns for fairness might prompt the prosecutor in appropriate 
situations to dismiss the indictment pending against the lowest level 
defendant, allowing him to plead guilty to a lesser offense not carrying a 
mandatory term of imprisonment.179  A virtuous prosecutor will appreciate 
that a harsh minimum mandatory sentence for a low-level player in a 
criminal enterprise may sometimes result in injustice where a mid-level 
player has “flipped,” and will thus take steps necessary to avoid that result. 
To summarize, accomplice bargaining encourages prosecutors to view 
witnesses in instrumental terms; that is, as means to secure convictions 
against other defendants.  The government’s widespread reliance on this 
 
Prosecutor’s Duty to “Seek Justice,” 90 CORNELL L. REV. 237, 248–49 (2004).  If 
substantial assistance were narrowly defined, a prosecutor would have no power to alleviate 
the injustices that can result from the cooperation paradox discussed above.  Certain 
individual United States Attorney’s offices have enacted office guidelines constraining a 
prosecutor’s discretion in making the “substantial assistance” determination, such as 
requiring that 5K1.1 motions be approved by a committee, requiring that a defendant earn a 
5K1.1 departure by engaging in covert activity, or requiring that the defendant’s assistance 
lead to the indictment of additional individuals.  See Lee, supra note 153, at 125–28.  To 
date, however, these policy enactments have been isolated, and there have been no efforts 
on a national level to eliminate altogether a prosecutor’s discretion to file a substantial 
assistance motion. 
 179 For federal prosecutors, the requirement of the Ashcroft Memorandum that the 
prosecutor charge the “most serious, readily provable offense” may foreclose this option in 
the absence of substantial assistance.  See Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 161.  For an 
attack on the Ashcroft directive and a spirited argument that a prosecutor’s ethical 
obligation to “seek justice” assumes the existence of charging discretion, see Ely, supra note 
178, at 250–51. 
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practice leads prosecutors to view convictions as objectives paramount to 
other values in the criminal justice system, such as accuracy, equity, and 
procedural fairness.  This dynamic tends to obscure and at times obstruct 
ethical decisionmaking.  My goal in this Part has been to demonstrate that a 
prosecutor who is attentive to the virtues of honesty, courage, fairness, and 
prudence will be better equipped to make difficult ethical choices about 
whether to offer leniency to a charged accomplice in the first instance, and 
about structuring a cooperation agreement and an ultimate sentence in 
order to promote true and fair results. 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF THE “APPARENTLY” TRUTHFUL DEFENSE WITNESS 
 Assistant District Attorney Jack Jones is prosecuting a defendant 
charged with assault and battery.  The defendant is accused of beating 
the victim during a barroom brawl, causing substantial bodily injury.   
 The victim claims that he and the defendant entered into an argument 
while watching a football game one afternoon in a sports bar.  Insults 
were traded, and the argument became heated.  According to the victim, 
the defendant pushed him, at which point the victim tried to punch the 
defendant to protect himself, but missed.  The defendant then pounced 
on the victim and severely beat him, causing a broken nose, two black 
eyes, and lacerations on the face. 
 Defendant claims self-defense.  Defendant testifies that the victim 
started the fight by pushing the defendant off of his bar stool and by 
threatening him with a beer bottle.  Who started the fight (and with 
what level of force) are the key issues in the case. 
 The defendant calls as a witness the bartender who was on duty at the 
time of the fight.  Although the bartender did not witness the start of the 
physical altercation (he was serving patrons at the other end of the bar 
and his back was turned to the defendant and the victim at the time the 
fight started) he did hear some of the argument leading up to the fight.  
The bartender testifies on direct examination that the victim was drunk 
and belligerent, and that he was repeatedly insulting the defendant 
(including calling him derogatory names such as “moron” and 
“loser”). 
 The prosecutor knows that the bartender has previously been 
convicted of receiving stolen property.  Should the prosecutor impeach 
the bartender with this prior conviction on cross-examination? 
A lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal precludes him from offering 
testimony that he knows to be false.180  However, when an advocate 
 
 180 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2004). 
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impeaches a truthful witness on cross-examination he is not “offering” 
false evidence.  He is discrediting testimony that has already been offered.  
Discrediting truthful testimony is not the equivalent of affirmatively 
presenting a false fact, although it certainly has a similar effect because it 
points the finder of fact away from truth and toward falsehood.  The uneasy 
tension between two professional obligations—the duty of candor to the 
tribunal and the duty of vigorous advocacy on behalf of a client181—has 
led to heated debate about when it is ethically appropriate to impeach a 
truthful witness.182 
Most scholars now agree that it is ethically appropriate, if not ethically 
required, for a criminal defense attorney to impeach a truthful witness.183  
However, these same commentators diverge on how they reach this widely-
shared view.  Some rest their argument on the presumption of innocence 
and the criminal defense lawyer’s duty to insure that the government has 
met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.184  Others suggest that 
the right to cross-examine a truthful witness grows out of the criminal 
defense lawyer’s access to confidential information from his client, and the 
burden on the attorney-client relationship that would be imposed if defense 
counsel was required to forego cross-examination based on facts revealed 
to him in confidence.185  Still other commentators argue that this latitude 
stems from the criminal defense attorney’s duty of zealous advocacy, and 
the possible inference of guilt a jury might draw against a criminal 
defendant if counsel were to fail to vigorously cross-examine a government 
witness.186  While not adopting any one of these three rationales to the 
 
 181 Id.; see also id. R. 1.1.  Comment 2 to Rule 3.3 underscores this tension by 
recognizing that “[a] lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an 
obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force.” 
 182 See Robert P. Lawry, Cross-Examining the Truthful Witness: The Ideal Within the 
Central Moral Tradition of Lawyering, 100 DICK. L. REV. 563, 577–78 (1996).  For an 
argument that in civil cases an attorney’s duty of candor to the tribunal outweighs that 
attorney’s duty of zealous advocacy during cross-examination, see WOLFRAM, supra note 
125, § 12.4.5, at 650–51. 
 183 Lawry, supra note 182, at 577–78 (summarizing authorities). 
 184 David G. Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel’s 
Responsibility, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1494 (1966); Warren E. Burger, Standards of 
Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel: A Judge’s Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 
11, 14–15 (1966).  This position has come to be known as the “Burger-Bress” argument in 
support of allowing a criminal defense attorney to impeach a truthful witness. 
 185 Freedman, supra note 2, at 1474–75. 
 186 See David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 92 
(David Luban ed., 1984) (“The goal of zealous advocacy in criminal defense is to curtail the 
power of the state over its citizens.  We want to handicap the state in its power even 
legitimately to punish us.”); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257–58 (1967) 
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the criminal defense 
attorney’s mission bears little relation to the “search for truth.”). 
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exclusion of others, the American Bar Association has agreed that a 
criminal defense attorney may properly impeach a truthful witness.187  In 
its Criminal Justice Standards, the ABA states that “[d]efense counsel’s 
belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the truth does not preclude 
cross-examination.”188 
But what about the prosecutor’s obligation in this situation?  Few of 
the rationales for recognizing a criminal defense exception to a duty of 
candor during cross-examination support allowing a prosecutor to 
undermine the credibility of a person the prosecutor reasonably believes 
has testified truthfully.  The prosecutor bears the burden of proof in 
criminal cases; his obligations point toward establishing reliable evidence, 
rather than discrediting it.  The prosecutor does not have an individual 
client who can provide him with confidential information.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor has a moral obligation as a minister of justice to try to ensure 
that the innocent are not convicted.189  Inviting the jury to disbelieve 
relevant truthful testimony may increase the risk of an erroneous verdict.  
Finally, reasonable jurors may expect that a representative of the 
government will conduct himself with less partisanship than a private 
attorney;190 thus, it may be less likely that a juror will draw a negative 
inference against the state’s case from the government’s failure to cross-
examine a witness than it may from the same omission by defense counsel.  
Each of these differences may point to an obligation on the part of the 
prosecutor to observe greater restraint in cross-examination than the 
criminal defense attorney.191  On these grounds, both Bruce Green and 
Samuel Levine have independently concluded that it is “clearly” unethical 
for a prosecutor to impugn the credibility of a witness known to be telling 
 
 187 One reference in the comments to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards (albeit in the 
section discussing the prosecution function) might suggest that the ABA found the Burger-
Bress “burden of proof” argument most compelling in enacting Standard 4-7.6.  “In this 
regard, it is believed that the duty of the prosecutor differs from that of the defense lawyer, 
who on occasion may be required to challenge known truthful witnesses of the prosecution 
in order to put the State to its proofs.”  ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, 
Standard 3-5.7 cmt.   
 188 See id. Standard 4-7.6(b). 
 189 Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 
321–23 (2001) (arguing that the prosecutor has a legal and ethical duty to promote truth and 
to refrain from conduct that impedes the truth).  
 190 Cf. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (suggesting that ethical missteps 
by a prosecutor may influence the jury more than analogous ethical missteps by a defense 
attorney because of the jurors’ comparative expectations about the two roles). 
 191 The Supreme Court has stated that a public prosecutor, as a servant of justice, has an 
obligation not to present false evidence or engage in other trial methods “calculated to 
mislead the jury.”  Id. at 85 (emphasis added). 
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the truth.192 
While at first blush this imperative seems sound—especially in light 
of the “minister of justice” mandate of Rule 3.8—the Green/Levine 
conclusion may be both overly facile and overly broad.  It is overly facile 
because it is rare for a prosecutor to “know” that a witness is telling the 
truth.  In the hypothetical described above, does the prosecutor “know” that 
the victim was drunk and prompted the barroom altercation with the 
defendant through the use of belligerent language?  The prosecutor may 
have no reason to disbelieve the bartender’s version of events in this 
regard, but that does not mean the witness’s narrative is known to be true.  
Even if the prosecutor is privy to extrajudicial facts that supported the 
bartender’s testimony, the prosecutor does not necessarily know the truth of 
these facts, because he was not present at the scene of the crime.  For 
example, let us imagine that two other eyewitnesses interviewed by the 
police at the scene of the crime, but presently unavailable to testify, support 
the theory that the victim was drunk and belligerent at the time of the fight.  
These two other bar patrons interviewed by the police may be lying, or 
each might harbor some form of bias against the victim.  What we have 
here is a problem of epistemology.  A prosecutor’s belief in the truth of a 
fact may vary by degree, but his “knowledge” of that fact is seldom 
absolute.193 
Furthermore, Professor Green’s and Professor Levine’s resolution of 
this difficult issue may be overly broad because it fails to distinguish 
between general forms of impeachment and specific forms of 
impeachment.  A general form of impeachment suggests that the witness is 
an untruthful person (e.g., impeachment with prior acts of dishonesty or 
reputation for dishonesty, impeachment with prior conviction, etc.)194 and 
provides the jury with a reason to disregard all of the witness’s proffered 
testimony if it chooses to do so.  A specific form of impeachment (e.g., an 
 
 192 Green, supra note 20, at 1596; Levine, supra note 134, at 1345; see also WOLFRAM, 
supra note 125, § 12.4.5, at 650–51 (arguing that while there is general agreement that 
defense counsel may attempt to persuade a jury to disbelieve a witness known to be truthful, 
it is clear that prosecutors should not be permitted to do the same). 
 193 Imagine a criminal case where the defendant presents an alibi defense through a 
relative (e.g., the defendant’s cousin testifies that he was with the defendant at a restaurant 
having dinner on the night and time of the alleged crime).  The cousin produces a credit card 
record that reveals a charge at the same restaurant on the night in question.  Even with this 
paper record, the prosecutor does not “know” that the cousin has testified truthfully.  
Someone else may have used his credit card at the restaurant, or the cousin may have dined 
at the restaurant with another guest.  Now suppose that there was a security camera in 
operation at the restaurant.  The videotape shows two diners matching the general 
description of the defendant and his cousin (age, sex, race, height), but the picture is grainy.  
Even then, the prosecutor does not “know” that the cousin is telling the truth. 
 194 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608(b), 609. 
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impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement on the same topic)195 
invites the jury to disbelieve one part of the witness’s testimony.  It is rare 
in criminal cases for a witness to testify to only one salient fact.  Telling a 
prosecutor that he may not “impugn the credibility”196 of a truthful witness 
fails to distinguish between circumstances where the witness testifies to 
only one fact, or testifies to several facts.  In the latter circumstances, it 
fails to answer the question whether a prosecutor is ever warranted in 
attempting to undermine a portion of a witness’s testimony through a 
general form of impeachment. 
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards shed very little light on this 
difficult issue.  Standard 3-5.7(b) provides as follows: “The prosecutor’s 
belief that the witness is telling the truth does not preclude cross-
examination, but may affect the method and scope of cross-examination.  A 
prosecutor should not use the power of cross-examination to discredit or 
undermine a witness if the prosecutor knows the witness is testifying 
truthfully.”197  This standard accomplishes little beyond stating what 
should by now be obvious; when a prosecutor knows that a witness is 
telling the truth he should not attempt to discredit that testimony, but where 
he simply believes that the witness is telling the truth he may cross-
examine the witness.198  The ABA standard fails to recognize the wide gulf 
in most cases between the extremes of knowledge and belief, and thus 
provides little ethical guidance for the conscientious prosecutor striving to 
do what is just.  Even more significantly, it does not offer any distinction 
between general and specific forms of impeachment, suggesting instead 
that the “method” of cross-examination rests solely in the discretion of the 
individual prosecutor. 
This may be a situation where rules simply fail us.  Even if Standard 
3-5.7 were enacted in some fashion as a component of ABA Model Rule 
3.8, it would be largely unenforceable.  Fashioning limits to the scope of a 
prosecutor’s cross-examination based on the state of mind of the prosecutor 
would be destined for failure, because such subjective knowledge or belief 
is rarely provable as an objective matter in later professional disciplinary 
proceedings.   
 
 195 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 613. 
 196 Levine, supra note 134, at 1345. 
 197  ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 3-5.7(b).  
 198 The National District Attorneys Association guidelines for prosecutors (The 
“National Prosecution Standards”) take a position on this issue similar in its vagueness to 
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 3-5.7.  Section 77.6 states that 
“Counsel should not misuse the power of cross-examination or impeachment to ridicule, 
discredit, undermine, or hold the witness up to contempt, if counsel knows the witness is 
testifying truthfully.”  NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 
§ 77.6 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS] (emphasis added).   
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Character is essential to a prosecutor’s nuanced assessment of the 
facts and circumstances of particular cases in this area.  Rather than asking 
the question what prosecutors should “do” in this situation, perhaps we 
should change the focus and inquire into what types of people we want 
them to be.  In particular, the virtues of courage and fairness might help 
guide prosecutors in discerning an appropriate course of action when faced 
with the question of whether to cross-examine an apparently truthful 
witness. 
First, the prosecutor should be courageous enough to forego cross-
examination entirely wherever he perceives that this course of action is in 
the best interest of justice.  Sometimes the hardest phrase for any lawyer to 
utter in a courtroom is “No questions, Your Honor.”  Hollywood depictions 
of withering cross-examinations in criminal cases have become ingrained 
in our consciousness.  The lawyer is perceived as gladiator, and the citizens 
of Rome enter the coliseum expecting to witness bloodshed.  Prosecutors 
may feel that if they forego cross-examination, they run the risk of being 
viewed as weak—not only by the jurors, but also by any law enforcement 
colleagues in the courtroom observing the trial.  Government lawyers must 
resist this pernicious attitude.  Prosecutors who flex their muscles in the 
courtroom solely for the purpose of posturing in front of the jury have lost 
sight of the critical difference between their role and the role of criminal 
defense counsel.  Moreover, a prudent and courageous prosecutor 
understands that sometimes the decision not to cross-examine a witness is a 
sign of integrity and strength rather than weakness.  The phrase “No 
questions, Your Honor” can be a display of confidence that signals to the 
jury that the facts testified to by the witness are wholly consistent with the 
government’s theory of its case. 
Potential unfairness toward the witness should also be an omnipresent 
concern.  A prosecutor must be cognizant of the tremendous power of 
cross-examination, and how it may feel as a witness to have one’s 
credibility and integrity questioned in a public forum.  Experiencing the 
courtroom from the point of view of the “other” might help the prosecutor 
shape the scope and content of his cross-examination, if cross-examination 
is conducted at all.  The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an 
attorney during representation of a client from using means that “have no 
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third 
person.”199  Cross-examination that attempts to show that the witness is 
lying on a critical matter certainly serves a “substantial purpose,” because it 
 
 199 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2004).  Comment 1 to Rule 4.4 
suggests that testing the government’s proof is a “substantial purpose” justifying cross-
examination by a criminal defense attorney.  “Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to 
subordinate the interests of others to those of the client . . . .”  Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 1.   
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assists the jury in deciding contested facts.  But what about general forms 
of impeachment that are used to impeach a witness only on minor details of 
the witness’s testimony?  For example, impeachment with a prior 
conviction or a prior act of dishonesty may not only be embarrassing to the 
witness, it may be unnecessary where the prosecutor believes the witness 
has testified truthfully during a large portion of his narrative, and only 
desires to impeach him on minor details (such as his perception of time, 
distance, etc.).  By using a sledgehammer where a scalpel may suffice, the 
prosecutor may not be pursuing a “substantial purpose” within a fair 
reading of Rule 4.4. 
Witnesses who are subpoenaed to testify in criminal cases 
undoubtedly arrive at court with the expectation that they will be 
vigorously and searchingly cross-examined by defense counsel.  However, 
they have a right to expect something different from their government 
representatives.  The National District Attorneys Association has stated that 
“[t]he interrogation of all witnesses should be conducted fairly, objectively, 
and with due regard for the dignity and legitimate privacy of the 
witness.”200  Prosecutors who play the role of gladiators on cross-
examination for little purpose other than to embarrass or intimidate the 
witness risk undermining the public’s confidence in the criminal justice 
system, and offending the very citizens the government depends upon to 
step forward with critical information. 
While it may be impossible to formulate a workable rule that provides 
both guidance and flexibility in this area, a few general principles emerge 
from the foregoing discussion.  First, a prosecutor’s mere belief that the 
witness is telling the truth should never preclude cross-examination.  The 
very purpose of an adversary proceeding is to have the truth revealed 
through the crucibles of direct and cross-examination.  Prosecutors need 
not substitute their personal feelings or gut hunches for the possible 
conclusions of the jury.201  On the other hand, prosecutors frequently have 
access to extrajudicial evidence that the jury will never hear, including 
statements from witnesses unavailable to testify at trial, information from 
confidential informants, and other forms of inadmissible hearsay.  What the 
prosecutor can reasonably conclude happened in the case is influenced not 
only by facts provable in court, but also by information contained in the 
investigatory file.  Perhaps a workable principle that bridges the wide gap 
between “knowledge” and “belief” is that a prosecutor should not 
undermine the credibility of a witness on a factual point where the 
 
 200 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 198, § 77.6 cmt. 
 201 “[A] prosecutor is not required to substitute personal opinion for the available fact-
finding processes of the trial . . . .” ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, 
Standard 3-5.7 cmt. 
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prosecutor firmly believes that no reasonable juror, in possession of the 
same information known to the prosecutor, could reasonably conclude that 
the fact is untrue.  A “firm belief” standard—taking into account both the 
evidence produced at trial and any extrajudicial information in possession 
of the prosecutor—might adequately respect both the jury’s ultimate role as 
factfinder and the prosecutor’s moral responsibility as an agent of the truth.  
In my hypothetical above, if the prosecutor firmly believes that the 
bartender is telling the truth about the victim’s intoxication and 
belligerence, he should not raise the issue of the witness’s prior conviction 
on cross-examination because this would serve no legitimate purpose other 
than to embarrass and to misleadingly discredit the witness. 
This analysis still begs the question of whether there should be any 
distinction between specific and general forms of impeachment, an issue 
left completely unaddressed by ABA Criminal Justice Standard 3-5.7.  It 
would make no sense to advise a prosecutor that when a witness has 
testified truthfully in part and deceptively in part the prosecutor may not 
engage in a general form of impeachment.202  If, as the law presumes, a 
prior act of dishonesty or a prior conviction is probative of credibility, it is 
no less probative on this point simply because the witness has testified to 
several subject matters rather than to just one.  Even the most inveterate 
and accomplished liar is capable of telling the truth on occasion when it 
suits his purpose.  Perhaps the appropriate safety valve here is not in 
limiting cross-examination, but rather in limiting closing argument.  The 
virtues of honesty, fairness, and courage suggest that a prosecutor who 
engages in a general form of impeachment of a witness who he believes has 
testified truthfully in part but untruthfully in part should refrain from 
arguing in his summation that the witness is unworthy of belief in all 
respects; rather, he should argue only that the witness’s character for 
dishonesty should lead the jury to disbelieve identified parts of the 
witness’s testimony.  In this manner, the prosecutor avoids urging the jury 
to discredit testimony that the prosecutor has strong reason to believe is 
true.203 
 
 202 The pertinent National District Attorneys Association standard states that “[t]he 
credibility of any witness may be alluded to by a showing of any prior conviction.”  
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 198, § 77.6.  This standard suggests that a 
general form of impeachment may be warranted even where the prosecutor believes the 
witness is testifying truthfully as to certain matters and untruthfully as to others.  
 203 Providing the jury with reasons not to believe a truthful witness may be as 
misleading to the jury as urging it to believe false testimony.  Cf. In re Dreiband, 77 
N.Y.S.2d 585, 585–86 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (upholding disciplinary sanction against 
prosecutor for “knowingly using false testimony of People’s witness in summation”). 
CASSIDY_FINALREAD 11/13/2006  7:18:19 PM 
140 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  [VOL. 82: 2 
IV.  THE PROBLEM OF THE INCOMPETENT DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
 Assistant District Attorney Susan Smith is prosecuting a defendant 
charged with armed robbery.  The defendant allegedly stole an elderly 
woman’s purse at knifepoint as the victim was coming out of an 
automatic teller machine (ATM) kiosk.  The victim picked the defendant 
out of a group of mug shots at the police station several hours after the 
incident, and is able to identify him at trial.  The defendant has several 
prior convictions on his record, including felony convictions for larceny 
by false pretenses and distribution of heroin, and several misdemeanor 
convictions for shoplifting. 
 The defendant is represented at trial by attorney Jay Sullivan, 
appointed counsel.  Prior to trial, Sullivan moves to suppress the photo 
identification.  After a hearing on this motion, it is denied by the court.  
Sullivan’s trial strategy is to 1) question the victim’s opportunity to get 
a good view of her attacker (it was admittedly dark outside the kiosk 
and the incident lasted only a matter of several seconds), and 2) to 
present an alibi defense.  The defendant testifies on his own behalf at 
trial that he was having Sunday dinner at his cousin’s house at the time 
of the alleged robbery.  Defendant is impeached by the prosecutor on 
cross-examination with the prior convictions. 
 The prosecutor is concerned about the competence of defense 
counsel.  Attorney Sullivan appears to the prosecutor outside of the 
courtroom to be very harried, disorganized, and suffering from stress.  
Although he litigates a nonfrivolous motion to suppress in the case, he 
does not appear to have adopted a trial strategy beneficial to his client.  
There are several inconsistencies between the victim’s trial testimony 
and the account of the incident she gave to police officers reflected in a 
written report (concerning the time of the incident, the clothing worn by 
the attacker, the precise location on the street that the robbery took 
place, etc.).  Attorney Sullivan does not raise these inconsistencies on 
cross-examination of the victim, relying instead exclusively on issues 
pertaining to the victim’s opportunity to get a good look at the 
perpetrator’s face.  Moreover, Attorney Sullivan does not put any 
witnesses on the stand to support defendant’s alibi defense other than 
the defendant himself, who Sullivan should have anticipated would have 
been subject to a stinging impeachment. 
Forty years after the Supreme Court guaranteed indigent persons the 
right to appointed counsel when charged with serious crimes, the promise 
of Gideon v. Wainwright204 remains largely unfulfilled in our country.  
With disturbing frequency, criminal defendants plead guilty to crimes or 
are convicted following trial after being represented by an attorney who 
 
 204 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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does not have the time, the ability, the resources, or the inclination to 
provide meaningful and competent representation.  A recent report from the 
American Bar Association supports this sobering conclusion: “Too often 
the lawyers who provide defense services are inexperienced, fail to 
maintain adequate client contact, and furnish services that are simply not 
competent, thereby violating ethical duties to their clients under rules of 
professional conduct.  Meanwhile, judges . . . routinely accept legal 
representation in their courtrooms that is patently inadequate.”205  This 
recent ABA study cited inadequate funding, poor training, lack of resources 
for investigative and expert services, and grossly excessive caseloads as 
factors contributing to the pervasive problem of ineffective representation 
by criminal defense lawyers.206  While this problem is not limited to 
appointed counsel, studies suggest that it is more acute in this area.207  
Indigent defendants, unlike paying clients, cannot fire their lawyer and hire 
someone more competent when they are displeased with the services of 
their attorney.208 
What should a conscientious prosecutor do when faced with a scenario 
such as that outlined above?  Not surprisingly, neither the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct nor the ABA Criminal Justice Standards address a 
prosecutor’s responsibilities when confronted with incompetent defense 
counsel.  If there is an answer to be gleaned from professional norms, it 
must start with a prosecutor’s obligation to seek justice.209  On the one 
hand, the prosecutor must be concerned with fundamental fairness toward 
the defendant, who may either 1) be innocent, 2) be guilty of a lesser crime, 
or 3) be factually guilty, but capable, with more effective counsel, of 
securing an acquittal based on reasonable doubt.  In addition, the 
prosecutor who suspects incompetence on the part of his opponent has an 
 
 205 ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, at iv–v (2004). 
 206 Id. at 7–19; see also Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a 
Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1178 (2003) (calling the problem a “national 
epidemic of neglect”). 
 207 See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 78–79 (1999).  A 1999 study in Harris County, 
Texas showed that of 30,000 annual felony filings, 58% of defendants with appointed 
counsel were sentenced to jail or prison, compared to 29% of defendants who retained 
private counsel.  Bob Sablatura, Study Confirms Money Counts in County’s Courts, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 17, 1999, at A1.  To adjust for sentencing and conviction patterns 
over a wide variety of crimes, the study also looked at one single felony charge for the same 
period (first time possession of less than one gram of cocaine) and determined that 57% of 
those defendants with court-appointed counsel were sentenced to jail or prison, while only 
25% of those defendants with private counsel were sentenced to serve time.  Id. 
 208 Green, supra note 206, at 1175. 
 209 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 3-1.2(c); see MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8. cmt. 1 (2004). 
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institutional interest in protecting the resources of his office and the 
appellate courts from ineffective assistance of counsel claims later raised 
on appeal, which will tie up the system and lead to unnecessary litigation. 
On the other hand, the prosecutor might personally be ill-equipped to 
separate incompetent lawyering from legitimate trial strategy, especially if 
he has never served in the defense role himself.  In the hypothetical 
described above, the defense attorney may have deliberately chosen not to 
cross-examine the victim with a prior inconsistent statement for fear of 
being perceived by the jury as “beating up” on a sympathetic elderly 
woman.  Defense counsel may be unable to call a witness to support the 
defendant’s alibi due to pragmatic considerations, such as substantial 
material in the cousin’s background to impeach him as a witness.  
Moreover, the defense counsel might have access to privileged information 
from the defendant that affects his tactical decisions in the case, but that is 
unknown to the prosecutor. 
Can a prosecutor realistically be expected to distance himself from his 
adversarial role in order to assist a defendant whom he perceives is being 
inadequately represented?  The prosecutor, like the defense attorney, has a 
client (society) and an ethical obligation to represent his client’s interests 
vigorously.210  While society certainly has an interest in providing fair 
trials to the criminally accused, society also has a compelling interest in 
seeing that guilty persons are punished and prevented in the future from 
preying on law abiding citizens.  It is difficult to see how a prosecutor 
could continue to function effectively in a trial setting (particularly in 
closing argument and in cross-examination) if he viewed his primary 
responsibility during adversarial proceedings as assuring the defendant a 
level playing field.211 
Unfortunately, Sixth Amendment safeguards are inadequate to prevent 
the injustices that can and do occur when a criminal defendant is poorly 
represented.212  In Strickland v. Washington,213 the Supreme Court 
enunciated a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims under the Sixth Amendment.  First, the defendant must show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient; that is, that counsel made errors so 
 
 210 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”). 
 211 See Hobot v. McGuiness, No. 96-CV-4324 FB, 1998 WL 642705, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 16, 1998) (ruling that prosecutor had no constitutional duty to notify the court of 
existence of report that defense counsel had neglected to use at trial); Fisher, supra note 12, 
at 226 n.135. 
 212 See Jeffrey Levinson, Don’t Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for 
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 177–78 (2001). 
 213 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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serious that in effect he was not functioning as “counsel” at all for Sixth 
Amendment purposes.  Second, defendant must show that this deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant; that is, that the outcome of the trial 
would likely have been different but for the mistakes of counsel.  The 
defendant must make both of these showings to demonstrate a 
constitutional violation.214 
To evaluate counsel’s performance under the first prong of Strickland, 
the standard for attorney performance is that of an ordinarily fallible 
lawyer.215  The Court has stated that judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
performance must be highly deferential to the lawyer because it is too 
tempting in hindsight for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s efforts 
after an adverse judgment.216  The defendant must overcome the 
presumption that the counsel’s performance under the circumstances might 
be considered sound trial strategy.217  To overcome this presumption, “the 
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
range of reasonableness.”218 
Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must 
show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.219  This 
prong requires more than a showing that counsel’s errors had some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding, because virtually 
every act or omission could meet that test.220  “The defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
 
 214 Id. at 687–90. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 689. 
 217 See id. 
 218 Id. at 688. 
 219 See id. at 692.  In United States  v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), decided the same 
day as Strickland, the Supreme Court stated that in rare circumstances ineffective assistance 
can be presumed without inquiry into whether it could have been a strategic decision or 
whether it prejudiced the case.  Id. at 659–60.  But the Court ruled that the facts of Cronic—
where inexperienced counsel was appointed to represent the defendant in a highly complex 
mail fraud case only twenty-five days before trial—did not warrant a presumption of 
prejudice.  Id. at 659.  The justification of a per se approach is that the likelihood of 
prejudice is so high that case-by-case inquiry is not worth the cost.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 692.  In Strickland, the Court mentioned a defense counsel laboring under a conflict of 
interest as one example where the Court would be willing to find per se ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  Id.  Subsequent to Strickland and Cronic, the federal courts have 
been willing to find prejudice per se in only very limited circumstances.  See, e.g., Tippins 
v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 684 (2d Cir. 1996) (defense counsel slept through the trial); United 
States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 884 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Geders v. United States, 425 
U.S. 80, 88–89 (1976) (finding prejudice per se under Sixth Amendment where the court 
interferes with defendant’s representation by ordering counsel not to consult with client 
during overnight recess). 
 220 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 
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errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”221  The 
Court in Strickland defined “reasonable probability” as “a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”222  The defendant 
must thus show a breakdown in the adversarial process that makes the 
result unreliable.223 
If the ineffective assistance of counsel standard under Strickland were 
sufficient to capture all situations where the defendant was actually 
prejudiced by his counsel’s incompetence, perhaps there would be no 
reason to impose any ethical duty on prosecutors to react to (or rectify) 
poor defense lawyering.  In those circumstances, the risk of reversal on 
appeal might itself be a sufficient incentive to prompt governmental 
vigilance.  But the Strickland standard is so narrow that reversals of 
convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel are very rare.224  First, 
there is a presumption that counsel was competent, and defendant bears the 
burden on appeal of proving otherwise.225  Second, defense counsel’s 
conduct will be measured against the conduct of a reasonable attorney, not 
a perfect or highly competent attorney, and the Court has expressly defined 
an objectively reasonable attorney as someone who makes mistakes.226  
Third, the defendant must convince the court that the result would have 
been different had he been represented by more competent counsel;227 in 
light of the Court’s stated interest in upholding the finality of convictions, 
proving what a hypothetical jury might have done under different 
circumstances is exceedingly difficult, especially where the government’s 
evidence of guilt is compelling.  Looking backward after trial to assess 
whether counsel’s deficiencies led to an unjust conviction “overlooks that 
the trial itself is a creature of counsel’s performance.”228  The appellate 
court is analyzing a record created by allegedly incompetent counsel; the 
conviction may appear to rest on strong or overwhelming evidence of guilt 
precisely because defense counsel failed to properly cross-examine 
government witnesses or failed to pursue exculpatory evidence.  It is 
particularly difficult to show in hindsight that omissions by defense counsel 
made a difference, because there it is a question not of what the lawyer did 
 
 221 Id. at 694. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 687. 
 224 See Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent 
Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062, 2068 (2000); see also Tippins, 77 F.3d at 690 (finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel only because counsel slept every day at trial). 
 225 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 226 Id. at 688. 
 227 Id. at 694. 
 228 Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity 
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 275 (1997). 
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badly, but rather of what he neglected to do at all.229  For each of these 
reasons, an “ineffective assistance [claim] is easily alleged but almost 
impossible to prove.”230 
In Gideon, some members of the Court invoked concepts of 
fundamental fairness in joining the decision to provide indigent criminal 
defendants with the right to appointed counsel.231  But since Strickland, the 
Court’s focus in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has shifted away from 
considerations of fairness to considerations of reliability; that is, the 
constitutional assurance of counsel is violated only where the defendant’s 
lawyer committed errors so serious that the result of the proceeding cannot 
be considered sound.232  This shift in emphasis has been critical.233  
Appellate courts will reverse a conviction on the grounds of ineffective 
assistance only where they are convinced that more competent counsel 
would have made a difference in the outcome of the case.  This approach is 
akin to validating the results of a track meet on the grounds that the 
claimant would have lost the race anyway—notwithstanding that the losing 
runner was provided unequal access to equipment, coaching, and training 
facilities, and was required to start the race ten yards behind his opponent.  
If gross disparities led to an unfair contest, how can one say with 
confidence that the outcome would not have been any different with a more 
level playing field? 
Certainly the prosecutor is not alone in shouldering responsibility for 
policing the adequacy of defense services.  The judge, too, has an 
obligation to seek justice, and a far more neutral role in the trial process 
than the government advocate.234  The primary responsibility to ensure a 
level playing field should rest with the judge, rather than with the 
prosecutor.  Several commentators have called upon trial judges to play a 
more active role in spotting and remedying defense incompetence when it 
occurs, as a way to make up for the perceived deficiencies of appellate 
review under Strickland.235  But judicial vigilance alone will not relieve 
 
 229 Green, supra note 206, at 1188. 
 230 Dripps, supra note 228, at 284. 
 231 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 232 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 233 See Dripps, supra note 228, at 279. 
 234 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2004). 
 235 See, e.g., Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the Court: Trial Court 
Responsibility for Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 29 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 425, 429–30 (2004) (placing burden on the court to remedy 
ineffectiveness before it gets to appeal, and arguing that the presumptive prejudice standard 
of Cronic should be followed where defense counsel is “egregiously ineffective” at trial and 
the court fails to inquire of defendant whether he is satisfied with his representation); Green, 
supra note 206, at 1194 (arguing that judges should inquire more deeply about defendant’s 
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prosecutors of the need to act in certain extreme circumstances, because 
certain forms of defense incompetence will be imperceptible to the judge.  
The prosecutor is more familiar with the facts of the case than the judge, 
and thus will be more sensitized to weaknesses in the government’s case 
that the defense attorney fails to exploit (exculpatory evidence, prior 
inconsistent statements, etc.).  The prosecutor may also have had dealings 
with the defense attorney outside the courtroom that give rise to suspicions 
of unpreparedness or incompetence (e.g., witnessing tremors or glassy eyes 
that raise the suspicion of substance abuse, or hearing the defense counsel 
confuse the facts of defendant’s case with those of another client during 
plea discussions).  The prosecutor may also be aware of a conflict of 
interest on the part of the defense counsel that would not be apparent to the 
judge.236  Closer scrutiny by trial judges of defense performance may 
reduce the acuity of this ethical dilemma for public prosecutors, but it 
cannot eliminate the problem altogether. 
The professional obligation of lawyers to report ethical misconduct by 
fellow attorneys to state licensing authorities is also an inadequate check on 
defense incompetence in criminal cases.  Today, all states but Kentucky 
and California have mandatory reporting rules fashioned in whole or in part 
on ABA Model Rule 8.3 and its predecessor, ABA Model Code provision 
DR-1-103(A).237  But this reporting obligation—often derisively termed 
the “snitch rule”—is one of the most “underenforced, and possibly 
unenforceable” mandates in all of legal ethics.238  Attorneys have trouble 
determining when opposing counsel’s inattention or poor performance rises 
 
satisfaction with defense counsel and defense counsel’s efforts on client’s behalf during 
change of plea colloquy, and should refuse to accept plea if unsatisfied); Russell G. Pearce, 
Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never Solve 
the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969, 
970–78 (2004) (arguing that we should move from a paradigm of judges as passive umpires 
to the paradigm of judges as active umpires, enabling them to ask questions of a witness to 
lay the foundation for the admission of evidence, or raise legal issues that the parties 
missed). 
 236 See United States v. Hedrick, 500 F. Supp. 977, 983 (C.D. Ill. 1980) (noting that 
prosecutor has obligation as minister of justice to call to the court’s attention a possible 
conflict of interest presented by defense counsel representing codefendants). 
 237 Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Current Development, A Current Look at Model 
Rule 8.3: How Is It Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
747, 755 (2003). 
 238 Id. at 747.  Indifference, fear of damaged reputation among colleagues, and concern 
over the time and energy it will take to follow through with a bar disciplinary report all 
combine to make the reporting obligation found in DR 1-103(A) and its successor Rule 8.3 
one of the most “widely ignored” attorney conduct rules.  See WOLFRAM, supra note 125, 
§ 12.10, at 683. 
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to the level of an ethical violation.239  Moreover, many states follow Model 
Rule 8.3(a) and provide that the ethical infraction observed must raise a 
“substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness 
as a lawyer in other respects” before an obligation to report is triggered.240  
Prosecutors who confront a defense lawyer performing inadequately in a 
particular matter might attribute it to poor preparation on that specific case, 
and may have little basis for concluding that such inattentiveness has 
spilled over to the other areas of his practice.  In addition, state snitch rules 
often are unclear on how strong a lawyer’s suspicion of ethical wrongdoing 
must be before a duty to report is triggered.241  For each of these reasons, 
there is scarce authority under Rule 8.3 for imposing a duty on prosecutors 
to report incompetent defense counsel.242  More fundamentally, however, 
the “snitch rule” cannot possibly protect a criminal defendant from the 
harsh consequences of an incompetent trial attorney, because the 
professional obligation of the prosecutor under Rule 8.3 is to report defense 
counsel to the bar disciplinary authority after the triggering event, not to 
the court before whom the ethical lapse occurs.243  A defendant may be 
convicted and sent to prison as a result of the errors of defense counsel; the 
snitch rule—leading at most to a post-conviction professional censure—
cannot possibly remedy this unfairness. 
Several scholars have addressed the issue of whether and when a 
prosecutor has an ethical obligation to intervene to address ineffective 
defense lawyering, but they have come to markedly different 
conclusions.244  While recognizing that codes of professional conduct fail 
 
 239 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004) (“A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client.”).  
 240 See id. R. 8.3(a) (emphasis added); WOLFRAM, supra note 125, § 12.10, at 684 
(arguing that the “substantial question” provision of Rule 8.3 is vague and indefinite). 
 241 See Ott & Newton, supra note 237, at 751 (noting that most courts interpreting the 
word “knowledge” in Rule 8.3 have equated knowledge with “substantial basis for belief”). 
 242 See Ariz. Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. No. 98-02 (1998) 
(stating that where a criminal defense lawyer files affidavit of ineffectiveness on appeal of 
criminal conviction, the appellate prosecutor has ethical obligation under Rule 8.3 to report 
this ineffectiveness to bar overseers if the appellate claim raises a “substantial” issue of trial 
counsel’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law); cf. In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 
2d 1239, 1249–50 (La. 2005) (ordering public reprimand of prosecutor for violation of Rule 
8.3, where prosecutor had learned that a prosecutorial colleague had suppressed exculpatory 
blood evidence in an armed robbery case and failed to report it). 
 243 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (requiring report to “appropriate 
professional authority”) (emphasis added). 
 244 Monroe Freedman was perhaps the first academic to address this ethical issue.  See 
Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney, 55 GEO. 
L.J. 1030 (1967).  In that article Freedman discussed the prosecutor’s responsibility when 
confronted with ineffective counsel, but only briefly.  Freedman concluded that because “the 
job of the prosecutor is not necessarily to convict, but to see that justice is done” a 
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to define a prosecutor’s ethical obligations in this complex area, Fred 
Zacharias has argued that the obligation to seek justice at a minimum 
obliges a prosecutor to preserve the basic requirements of an adversarial 
system.245  Zacharias identified an efficient adversarial system as a key 
element of the justice mandate, because our system relies upon the 
adversarial process to ensure procedural fairness.246  But Zacharias argued 
that the adversarial justice system breaks down most noticeably “when a 
criminal defense attorney does not even roughly match the prosecutor’s 
talents or fails to represent his client’s interests.”247  Effectively, that 
produces a proceeding that is a one-sided contest.248  In those situations, 
according to Zacharias, the prosecutor’s responsibility as a “minister of 
justice” requires him to attempt to “restore adversarial balance,” that is, to 
disavow zeal and instead promote procedural fairness.249 
In constructing this argument, Zacharias imagined three levels of 
substandard defense performance: 1) defense counsel makes no serious 
effort in defense of his client whatsoever, because he has no trial skills, is 
drunk, or is senile; 2) defense counsel performs, but he performs very badly 
by failing to ask important, relevant questions of witnesses on cross-
examination or by relying on an incoherent theory; and 3) defense counsel 
presents adequate direct and cross-examinations and generally performs 
aggressively, but he neglects to file a meritorious suppression motion or 
fails to object to damaging questions from the prosecutor.250  In the first 
scenario, Zacharias was confident that the prosecutor has witnessed a Sixth 
Amendment violation and therefore has an ethical obligation to undertake 
remedial steps to preserve the integrity of the trial process, such as 
 
prosecutor cannot sit idly by and allow defense counsel to render inadequate assistance.  Id. 
at 1032.  Freedman highlighted some of the tactics prosecutors have engaged in to actually 
exploit the situation where incompetent counsel represents the defendant, such as seeking a 
judicial forum where defense counsel is more likely to overlook the defects in the 
prosecutor’s case, putting favorable comments about defense counsel in the prosecutor’s 
closing argument in an effort to insulate a conviction from successful attack on appeal, and 
structuring a plea agreement in order to give the appearance that defense counsel has 
performed adequately on behalf of his client when in fact the case was overcharged from the 
beginning.  Id. at 1040–41.  Freedman illustrated the seriousness involved in a prosecutor’s 
ethical obligations by highlighting examples of unethical conduct in the face of defense 
ineffectiveness, but he offered no solution to the question of how bad a defense attorney’s 
conduct must be before a prosecutor has a duty to intervene, or exactly what form this 
intervention should take. 
 245 Zacharias, supra note 19, at 46–48. 
 246 Id. at 49. 
 247 Id. at 66. 
 248 See id. 
 249 See id. at 64. 
 250 Id. at 68–69. 
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notifying the judge or filing a motion to disqualify counsel.251  But for the 
second two scenarios (occurring far more often), Zacharias was far more 
tentative in both his approach and in his proposed solutions. Zacharias 
appeared to accept the conclusion that as long as the defense lawyer stays 
within “the wide range of professionally competent assistance” the 
prosecutor has no responsibility to act whatsoever.252  Where the defense 
counsel’s performance clearly falls below this acceptable range of conduct, 
the prosecutor should remedy the adversarial breakdown by either notifying 
the judge or by remonstrating with defense counsel and encouraging him to 
either improve his performance or withdraw.253  Among these two 
options,254 Zacharias reluctantly concluded that reporting lax opposition to 
the court is the most appropriate remedy whenever the prosecutor is 
“convinced of defense counsel’s inadequacy.”255  But Professor Zacharias 
failed to explain how a prosecutor can ever become so “convinced,” given 
that 1) the prosecutor is engaged in an adversarial role of his own, and 2) 
the prosecutor seldom is in the best position to perceive the reasons behind 
defense counsel’s choices. 
Vanessa Merton recently analyzed this same thorny ethical dilemma, 
but arrived at a conclusion very different from that of Fred Zacharias.  
Approaching the problem from the perspective of a supervising attorney 
 
 251 Id.; see also Bruce A. Green, Her Brother’s Keeper: The Prosecutor’s Responsibility 
when Defense Counsel has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16 AM. J. CRIM. L. 323, 341 
(1989) (arguing that a prosecutor has a duty to intervene whenever defense counsel is acting 
with a conflict of interest or is providing constitutionally ineffective assistance). 
 252 Zacharias, supra note 19, at 69. 
 253 Zacharias advances and rejects a third possibility: that a prosecutor could remedy 
poor performance by defense counsel by “pulling his punches” and providing less than 
vigorous advocacy on behalf of the state.  Zacharias properly rejects this response, because 
rather than improving the adversarial process, this approach eliminates the adversarial 
process completely.  Id. at 70.  Zacharias similarly rejects “helping” the defense counsel by 
introducing testimony favorable to the defendant, recognizing this as a subset of prosecuting 
less vigorously.  See id. at 71–72.  While hypothetically the prosecutor could remain within 
the adversarial role by simultaneously eliciting defense information from witnesses while 
continuing to argue against the significance of this evidence, Zacharias argues that 
prosecutors would find it very difficult to do this without breaking up the flow of their own 
presentations, and that even if they did the mere mention of a possible defense argument is 
not the equivalent of arguing in favor of its strength.  Moreover, if prosecutors routinely 
exercised the option of eliciting information favorable to the defense, in the long run this 
may reduce the adversarial nature of trials because some defense counsel may come to rely 
on such assistance and therefore become even less vigilant.  Id. at 71. 
 254 Zacharias recognized the huge practical difficulties of the remonstration approach.  
Id. at 72.  Confronting an attorney about his own incompetence or lack of attention to a case 
would certainly be a delicate conversation that many attorneys would be unable to handle in 
a productive fashion, even if they were willing to undertake it in the first instance. 
 255 Id. at 71, 74. 
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presiding over a law student prosecution clinic, Merton concluded that an 
ethical duty to remedy defense inadequacies is impractical to impose in 
practice.256 
At the outset, Professor Merton professed that her initial inclination 
when analyzing an ineffective assistance of defense counsel situation 
would have been to err on the side of fairness and seek to protect the rights 
of the defendant.257  However, Merton poignantly recounted an egregious 
case of ineffective counsel which arose for her student prosecutors, where 
she could not bring herself to insist that they do just that.258  While 
observing her students during a pretrial conference in a domestic violence 
case, Merton witnessed egregious behavior by the defense counsel that 
created an ethical dilemma about how the prosecutors should proceed.259  
Specifically, the defense counsel met with the student prosecutors showing 
no knowledge about the facts of the case, his client’s name, or even the 
charges against him.  Defense counsel had failed to return phone calls from 
the student prosecutors, and had coupled this rudeness with making a racial 
slur against one of the prosecutors at their first courtroom introduction.  
Counsel clearly had not communicated with his client about the underlying 
nature of the charge or the client’s objectives.  Compounding this 
ignorance, he inadvertently waived the attorney-client privilege and 
allowed his client to speak to the prosecutors in the courtroom corridor, 
making damaging admissions.260  Defense counsel thus single-handedly 
converted a possible dismissal into a solid case by inducing his client to 
provide a full confession, without ever having spoken to his client 
beforehand.261 
Faced with defense counsel’s utter lack of competence, Professor 
Merton and her student prosecutors faced the dilemma of whether to 
intervene, and if so how?  Merton realized that the defendant could not 
afford a better attorney, and that his rights were being violated by the lack 
of competent representation.  Ethically, she believed that they should take 
action by warning defense counsel about the consequences of his actions, 
or by alerting the trial judge and asking for a disqualification.  But the 
prosecution team was also faced with a terrified and beaten victim, a 
dangerous defendant, and a belligerent and confrontational defense counsel 
 
 256 Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of the Sixth 
Amendment” if You’re Trying to Put that Lawyer’s Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
997, 1047–53 (2000). 
 257 Id. at 1001. 
 258 Id. at 1002. 
 259 See id. at 1008–17. 
 260 See id. at 1005–17. 
 261 Id. at 1014. 
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who would not be open to assistance, let alone criticism.262  Merton’s 
assessment of the scholarly literature, including Fred Zacharias’s article 
discussed above,263 bolstered her instinct that an ethical duty on the part of 
the prosecutors may have existed in light of the “seek justice” mandate; 
however, when faced with a real life situation of incompetent counsel, she 
struggled to find an answer about how best to act upon such a duty.264  
Merton was disturbed by the possible effects on professionalism in 
commenting on the reputation or abilities of opposing counsel,265 voicing 
concern about the “ethics war” that could be triggered if prosecutors 
routinely acted upon a perceived duty to report defense inadequacies to the 
presiding judge.266  Also, Merton questioned whether an individual 
prosecutor—as part of a public office—realistically has the power to take 
remedial action in individual cases without a supervisor’s approval, often 
not obtainable in the thick of action.267  Finally, Merton viewed “reporting” 
as typically ineffective—trial judges are unlikely to remove counsel, and 
even if they do, the system cannot guarantee that replacement counsel will 
be any better or more prepared.268  Merton reluctantly concluded that 
although it may be warranted as a matter of discretion, there is no ethical 
requirement to remedy defense lapses absent a clear constitutional violation 
under Strickland.  Justifiably, she remains worried that there is a gap 
between commitment to ethical principles in the abstract, and specific 
performance in accord with that principle in the context of particular 
cases.269 
Considering the practical obstacles Merton recounts so skillfully, 
perhaps it is not surprising that few prosecutors, if any, ever take steps to 
rectify defense ineffectiveness.270  The Rules are imprecise, and tensions 
pulling in the opposite direction abound.  One reason that scholars have 
struggled with this ethical dilemma—and that rulemakers have totally 
ignored it—is that the only clear answer to the problem may be “it 
depends.”  Whether a prosecutor needs to intervene in the face of 
incompetent counsel will likely depend upon 1) how flawed the 
 
 262 See id. at 1017–18, 1040–41. 
 263 See supra notes 245–55.  
 264  Merton, supra note 256, at 1041–44. 
 265 Id. at 1039. 
 266 Id. at 1042. 
 267 Id. at 1043. 
 268 Merton imagines her students reporting the conduct of defense counsel to the trial 
judge, and the judge responding “‘Let me get this straight—you got an airtight, dead-on, all-
bases-loaded confession, IN the presence of counsel, and now you’re complaining?’”  Id. at 
1041. 
 269 See id. at 1004. 
 270 See Smith, supra note 13, at 396. 
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representation is; 2) how serious the consequences to the defendant are 
(e.g., is defendant facing a felony conviction and jail time, or only a first 
offense misdemeanor); 3) whether the defendant is represented by 
appointed or retained counsel;271 and 4) how perceptible the flawed 
lawyering may be to the presiding judge.  Assuming that the prosecutor 
decides that some intervention is necessary, he then faces the equally 
complex issue of how best to address the problem.  The answer to this 
question will likely depend upon 1) the stage of the case in which the 
incompetence arises;272 2) the prosecutor’s prior experience with the 
defense counsel (e.g., a familiarity with defense counsel’s work habits and 
personal style may give the prosecutor a reason to believe or disbelieve that 
private remonstration with the attorney will be effective in addressing the 
deficiency); and 3) the prosecutor’s assessment of the judge’s willingness 
to intervene if the problem is brought to his attention. 
Rather than focusing on rules and remedies, what if we changed the 
focus of our inquiry for a moment and asked what type of person we want 
our public prosecutors to be?  We can begin by identifying the wrong 
reasons for standing by and doing nothing in this situation.  One 
impediment to prosecutors taking action when faced with incompetent 
defense counsel may be lack of courage—they may fear losing the case, or 
fear being perceived as weak by colleagues in law enforcement if they step 
back from their adversarial role and advocate, even momentarily, for the 
interests of the defendant.  Professor Merton’s very honest account of her 
inability to act on a perceived ethical duty in this regard seems to suggest 
precisely such a failure; she recalls fearing that both the judge and higher-
ups in the District Attorney’s office would react negatively to such a 
suggestion by an individual student prosecutor who acts as a guest in the 
prosecutor’s office.273  Another impediment to ethical action may be a lack 
of commitment to fairness—what Bernard Williams calls a “settled 
 
 271 As argued supra note 207 and accompanying text, where the defendant has the 
financial resources to retain private counsel, he has more leverage over the services rendered 
and more ability to discharge the attorney if necessary. 
 272 If the perceived incompetence occurs prior to a change of plea, the court’s 
voluntariness colloquy with the defendant—if thoroughly conducted—may provide some 
assurance that there is a factual basis to the plea and that the defendant is satisfied with his 
counsel’s representation.  If the perceived incompetence occurs well in advance of trial, the 
government may assent to a motion for a continuance and thereby give the defense attorney 
more time and incentive to prepare.  See Stuard v. Stewart, 401 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 
2005) (recognizing that the prosecutor wisely advocated with the court for more time for 
defense counsel to prepare, in order to preserve the record from a challenge that defendant 
was forced to choose between effective assistance of counsel and his right to a speedy trial). 
 273 Merton, supra note 256, at 1042. 
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indifference” to the interests of others.274  Prosecutors may be incapable of 
seeing the defendant as an “other” worthy of respect, and thus disinclined 
to take any action designed to further the defendant’s interests.  If we 
expect prosecutors to both recognize and protect a defendant’s 
constitutional right to competent counsel, we need them to be attentive in 
the first instance to these virtues of fairness and courage. 
Perhaps the paramount virtue needed in this situation is the virtue of 
prudence, or practical wisdom.  A prudent prosecutor must be able to 
recognize and synthesize the multiplicity of concerns at stake.275  There are 
many legitimate interests pointing in the direction of doing nothing—such 
as a hesitance to interfere with deliberate but opaque choices made by 
defense counsel, a practical concern for the prompt resolution of cases, and 
a hesitance to poison the atmosphere of the courtroom by publicly accusing 
another lawyer of incompetence.  But a prudent prosecutor will also 
recognize that taking an ostrich-like approach to serious ineptitude may not 
avoid a clash of these interests; sometimes it may only defer them.  If the 
defendant is sentenced and incarcerated, he may later challenge his 
conviction on appeal claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. 
This may be the most intractable of my three ethical dilemmas.  It is 
not simply a question of the prosecutor perceiving his role too narrowly.  
The problem also stems from epistemological failures (i.e., the prosecutor 
having insufficient expertise and information to separate deliberate tactical 
decisions from incompetence) and systemic failures beyond the 
prosecutor’s control (i.e., lack of resources).  If the defense attorney’s 
incompetence is so egregious that it clearly violates Strickland, we do not 
need an ethical rule to spur meaningful government action, because where 
the incompetence is both gross and apparent, the prosecutor will be 
motivated by self-interest to preserve the conviction from successful attack 
on appeal.  Where ethical judgment is paramount is where the defense 
attorney’s representation is flawed, but just one iota above the 
impoverished constitutional standard.  How should a prosecutor behave 
when the defense attorney’s representation is within this zone of 
(mis)conduct? 
In light of the myriad contexts in which this problem may arise, it is 
impractical to fashion a clear set of priority rules that will address all of the 
factors discussed above and still give meaningful guidance to prosecutors.  
The best we could possibly hope for is a statement somewhere in the 
comments to Rule 3.8 that a prosecutor has an obligation to take proactive 
measures to protect the defendant’s right to counsel (either remonstration 
with the attorney or notification to the judge) when the prosecutor 
 
 274 WILLIAMS, supra note 88, at 93. 
 275 KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 74. 
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perceives that the defense attorney’s representation fails the first prong of 
the Strickland test; that is, when counsel’s performance falls measurably 
below the range of conduct expected of a reasonably competent 
attorney.276  It makes no sense to invite a prosecutor to take action only 
when the prosecutor perceives that both prongs of Strickland are satisfied, 
because under the second prong of Strickland the appellate court is looking 
backward at the trial to assess the reliability of the result.  It would be 
unworkable to ask a prosecutor to speculate about a future appellate court’s 
assessment of the reliability of a proceeding that has not yet concluded.  At 
most, such an approach would invite prosecutors to intervene or not 
intervene to protect defendant’s right to counsel based solely upon the 
prosecutor’s individual assessment of the government’s evidence.  
Ensconced in their adversarial role in the thick of trial, it may simply be 
asking too much of prosecutors to objectively assess the weaknesses of 
their own case. 
My point in this Article, however, is not to recommend insertion of 
some vague and passing reference to the first prong of Strickland 
somewhere in the comments to Model Rule 3.8.  That would be both 
ineffectual and unenforceable.277  My point is different.  If we recognize 
that a prosecutor’s decisions in this area are contextually driven, this reality 
magnifies, rather than trivializes, the importance of virtue.  Prosecutors 
should care about the quality of defense services rendered to the accused, 
and should not retreat like tortoises into the shell of their prosecutorial role.  
As a profession, however, we cannot be confident that prosecutors will 
even recognize this as an ethical problem—much less take personal 
ownership of it—unless the prosecutor is a person of fairness and honesty.  
We certainly cannot predict that a prosecutor will have the personal 
fortitude to intervene in any fashion unless they are persons of courage.  
And we cannot possibly expect prosecutors to be able to identify creative 
and effective ways to address the incompetence of their adversaries in 
particular cases unless they have developed the virtue of prudence. 
 
 276  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).  
 277 Model Rule 3.8(d) contains a requirement that prosecutors disclose evidence to the 
defense that “tends to negate the guilt” of the accused.  This ethical norm is patterned after 
the constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  Yet bar 
disciplinary authorities rarely discipline prosecutors for failing to fulfill their ethical duty to 
disclose exculpatory evidence, preferring instead to defer to the judicial branch’s 
enforcement of analogous constitutional norms on appeal from conviction.  See Richard A. 
Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 
N.C. L. REV. 693, 703 (1987). 
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CONCLUSION 
“[C]haracter might help us survive the corruption of our codes.” 278 
                                                                         —Thomas Shaffer 
 
A prosecutor’s duty to act as a minister of justice is not a 
“supererogatory”—the term ethicists often use to describe voluntary action 
which promotes the good.279  Comment 1 to Rule 3.8 attempts to make 
clear that the justice norm is mandatory rather than hortatory, by 
emphasizing that a prosecutor has a “responsibility” to seek justice.280  
However, this message is obscured both by the placement and context of 
the “justice” directive.  By dressing up certain minimum conduct rules 
within Rule 3.8 as ethical requirements, and then burying the “justice” 
exhortation in a later comment to the Rule, the drafters may be sending the 
signal that this conduct is optional rather than mandatory.  This is a 
mistake.  The responsibility to seek justice is an admonition with ethical 
content that demands serious moral reflection. 
 Those who struggle with rules “know well the limits of rule-making 
and rule implementation.”281  As the drafters of the Model Rules 
recognized, “no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by 
legal rules.”282  There is room for both specific rules and general norms in 
ethics codes, depending on their purpose.283  Forcing lawyers to act in a 
particular way and setting forth discipline when they fail to follow that 
requirement is the goal of specific rules.  Causing lawyers to reflect on 
their roles and internalize duties is more appropriately left for general 
norms.284  In this “rules versus standards” debate, both sides have valid 
claims.  Standards can be amorphous and unenforceable.  Rules may cause 
the regulated community to see minimal compliance as ethical behavior, 
rather than a floor below which their conduct may not fall. 
With respect to the three hard questions of prosecutorial ethics I have 
discussed in this Article, it may be impossible to be any more precise in our 
 
 278 SHAFFER, supra note 7, at 172.  Shaffer argues that workable ethical codes in the 
professions are those that depend on character, and that ethical codes in which that 
dependence is not implicit are corrupting.  Id. at 113.  In this Article I have argued that 
dependence on the character of prosecutors is implicit in the “minister of justice” mandate 
of Rule 3.8. 
 279 Perkins, supra note 49, at 198. 
 280 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004) (emphasis added).  
 281 Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in 
Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 5 (2005). 
 282 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope para. 16 (2004). 
 283 Zacharias, supra note 12, at 224. 
 284 Id. at 228–34. 
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professional code than the “seek justice”285 standard.  As I have argued, the 
variety and complexity of factual contexts in which these three ethical 
dilemmas arise belie any attempt at further specificity.  The “seek justice” 
mandate may be the most workable and appropriate standard for 
prosecutorial decisionmaking in each of these areas if it in fact encourages 
prosecutors to view their roles broadly and to be reflective about their 
obligations.286 
Nonetheless, the choice between enacting more specific rules and 
leaving it to elected and appointed prosecutors to develop office policies to 
guide the discretion of staff attorneys (accompanied with appropriate 
training and supervision) does not exhaust the range of available 
alternatives.  The call for development of office policies287 will at most 
help inform individual lawyers about the various factors to consider in 
making highly contextualized decisions.  Because there will always be gaps 
between practical theory and actual decisions in practice, it will be difficult 
to agree on a “general reductive method or a clear set of priority rules” to 
structure certain basic ethical decisionmaking.288  Moreover, office policies 
are not self-executing—they must be implemented by individuals, in real 
situations, in real time, amidst public and institutional pressure to secure a 
conviction. 
Professional norms are hollow without reference to the moral 
aspirations and sensitivities of individual actors working within their 
framework.  Absent a development of the moral self, prosecutors will not 
be willing or able to discern any ethical content to the “seek justice” 
admonition.  “The honesty and skill to discern what is right” lies in the 
virtues.289  Virtue cannot be taught in law school (although the 
conversation and the practice can certainly begin in law school, particularly 
in a clinical setting).290  It also cannot be commanded by rules.  “One of 
the main impetuses for the recent resurgence of interest in ethics of 
 
 285 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 10, Standard 3-1.2(c).  
 286 See Levine, supra note 134, at 1346.  Levine likened the “seek justice” mandate to 
the similarly broad directive in the Jewish tradition to “‘in all of your ways acknowledge 
God,’” id. at 1340 (quoting Proverbs 3:6), and concluded that “it may be not only helpful 
but perhaps necessary to consider the prosecutor’s ethical duties through guidelines 
articulated in broad principles such as the provision requiring that the prosecutor seek 
justice.”  Id. at 1346. 
 287 See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 21, at 897 (arguing that unless and until the 
profession agrees upon a coherent definition of neutrality, chief prosecutors should identify 
and make available for public scrutiny principles that will govern the decisions made by 
their offices). 
 288 Postema, supra note 39, at 67. 
 289 Perkins, supra note 49, at 189. 
 290 David Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 636, 644 
(1983). 
CASSIDY_FINALREAD 11/13/2006  7:18:19 PM 
2006] C H A R A C T E R  A N D  C O N T E X T  157 
virtue . . . is the sense that the enterprise of articulating principles of right 
has failed.”291  The advantage of virtue theory is that it provides a 
noncynical response to this failure of codification.292 
Some critics will argue that fairness, courage, honesty, and prudence 
are concepts only slightly less abstract than the duty to “seek justice.”  
They will criticize my approach for substituting one set of highly 
generalized standards for another. 293  While I concede that the key virtues 
I have identified might not lead a prosecutor to one right decision in every 
situation,294 they can help prosecutors filter out the wrong reasons for 
acting.  The joint talismen of fairness, courage, honesty, and prudence 
might serve as anchors to help prosecutors guard against moral drift in their 
practice of law.  Moreover, a renewed focus on the virtues might promote a 
culture of thoughtful decisionmaking in the prosecutorial community, thus 
providing individual prosecutors with the intestinal fortitude necessary to 
resist both institutional pressures and the unscrupulous direction of other 
actors within the system. 
My focus on virtue leads me to three final recommendations and one 
observation about professionalism within prosecutor’s offices.  First, chief 
prosecutors and hiring managers should seek to hire young attorneys who 
either possess or have the capacity to develop the virtues of courage, 
honesty, fairness, and prudence.  This is not to say that other attributes are 
not important to success as a prosecutor—including, of course, intelligence, 
energy, and trial advocacy skills.  But these latter attributes are often given 
inordinate weight in the hiring process, to the detriment of the virtues, 
 
 291 Watson, supra note 27, at 454. 
 292 Id. at 453–54. 
 293 My colleague Paul Tremblay has lamented the “slipperiness” of virtue ethics. 
Tremblay, supra note 127, at 510.  In the debate between virtuists and casuists, a casuist 
might claim that virtue ethics does not produce a concrete “answer” to moral dilemmas, and 
provides only “meager guidance” for practitioners confronting ethical conflicts in real life 
situations.  Id. at 510, 520.  While I agree that virtue theory will not always reveal to a 
conscientious moral actor one proper course of conduct, it certainly helps to separate better 
decisions from worse ones.  Even more significantly, however, acting from a proper motive 
is ultimately more important for a virtue ethicist than doing the so-called “right thing,” 
assuming that there is ever one such a result.  Keenan, supra note 49, at 117.  Finally, 
casuistry is not as concrete and definitive a form of ethical reasoning as its supporters might 
suggest.  Not all actors are equally capable of recognizing abstract principles in paradigm 
cases, and then applying these maxims to what they perceive are analogous situations.  
Tremblay, supra note 127, at 517–19 (suggesting that such a method can provide for the 
resolution of ethical dilemmas with “probable certitude”) (emphasis added).  What virtue 
theory offers that casuistry does not is an explanation of how moral agents can better equip 
themselves internally to make informed ethical choices.  See supra notes 127–30 and 
accompanying text. 
 294 See supra note 110. 
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which may be viewed as softer variables and thus more difficult to assess.  
Chief prosecutors should ask questions during the interview process that 
attempt to draw out a candidate’s character, or what Philippa Foot refers to 
as the “disposition of [one’s] heart.”295  They can do so by asking 
hypothetical questions that are designed to test whether honesty, fairness 
and prudence are qualities likely to be compromised by the lawyer in the 
face of competing pressures.  Hiring managers should also look for 
experiences in the candidate’s background that may have helped shape his 
or her virtues during formative periods of the candidate’s life—such as 
leadership displayed on unpopular causes, service to the poor and 
marginalized in society, a track record of being able to make difficult 
decisions in complex situations, etc. 
My second recommendation is directed at individual prosecutors 
themselves, particularly at young prosecutors just beginning their careers.  
New prosecutors should be very careful about whom they pick as role 
models in their offices.  When young lawyers join a prosecutor’s office 
they should seek guidance from more experienced lawyers whom they 
believe exhibit the virtues of courage, fairness, honesty, and prudence.  
Aristotle recognized that to understand the nature of good judgment in 
political affairs we must identify those who have it, watch what they do, 
and listen to what they have to say.296  Good character comes from living 
in communities where virtue is encouraged (families, churches, schools 
and, I would argue, some professional environments) and then modeling 
the behavior of others.297  “[T]here is no way to possess the virtues except 
as part of a tradition in which we inherit them and our understanding of 
them from a series of predecessors . . . .”298  When confronting difficult 
decisions in the course of investigation or litigation of criminal cases, 
prosecutors should seek advice from the lawyers in the office whose 
judgment they respect and admire, not necessarily those who have the 
highest conviction rates or the greatest public stature.299 
My third recommendation is that managers in prosecutor’s offices 
should not place young and inexperienced attorneys in positions where they 
need to make broad and difficult discretionary decisions.300  Deliberation is 
 
 295 Foot, supra note 109, at 108. 
 296 ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch.11, at 186. 
 297 Shaffer, supra note 28, at 883; see STANLEY HAUERWAS, The Self as Story, in VISION 
AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION 68, 76 (1974).  
 298 MACINTYRE, supra note 29, at 127. 
 299 See Kenneth Bresler, “I Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of 
Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 546 (1996). 
 300 At least two of the three hard ethical questions addressed in this Article (structuring 
deals to accomplice witnesses and rectifying the effects of ineffective assistance of counsel) 
are more likely to arise in felony cases rather than misdemeanor cases routinely prosecuted 
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not something that everyone does equally well.  According to Aristotle, the 
young are particularly handicapped in exercising the virtue of prudence due 
to their lack of practical experience over time.301  Prosecutor’s offices 
should thus be scrupulous in their decisions of who to promote and when to 
promote them.  Conviction rates and the ability to “move” cases should not 
be the sole keys to advancement as a prosecutor.  Promotion should be 
granted only after a lawyer has demonstrated a capacity for honesty, 
courage, fairness, and above all prudence.  Senior managers can identify 
these prosecutors through the fruits of their labors; that is, their 
demonstrated capacity to exercise discerning judgment in difficult 
situations. 
Finally, my analysis leads me to one cautiously optimistic observation 
about the professional life of prosecutors.  As elastic and amorphous as the 
“seek justice” obligation may seem, it can be a source of professional 
inspiration and satisfaction for virtuous prosecutors who take it seriously.  
Abbe Smith has asked the question whether a “Good Person [Can Be] a 
Good Prosecutor” and has concluded, rather provocatively, that he 
cannot.302  “It is especially difficult for prosecutors with ideals and 
ambition to resist the pressure to adapt, conform, and be part of the 
team.”303  According to Smith, the temptation to win at all costs, or at least 
to adopt a win at all costs mentality, is simply too great to be neutralized by 
the good intentions of prosecutors working within the system.  I must 
respectfully disagree—not only because I know many good people who are 
also good prosecutors, but also because I know from firsthand experience 
that it is possible to resist many of the temptations brought upon 
prosecutors to cut corners, including pressure from the police, the public, 
and a daunting workload.  
The reality is that people of integrity might find more personal 
satisfaction and source of inspiration in criminal prosecutions than in 
adversarial roles where they must fulfill third personal demands of clients.  
 
in the district or municipal courts of this country, because the factual allegations are more 
complex and the consequences to the defendant more grave.  I would argue that even the 
third dilemma (whether to impeach a witness the prosecutor believes is testifying truthfully) 
tends to arise more in serious felony cases.  The more serious the case, the greater access the 
prosecutor will have to detailed investigative reports from the police, reciprocal discovery 
from the defendant, and grand jury testimony.  In these cases the prosecutor will be in a 
better position to reach an informed judgment prior to cross-examination about whether or 
not a defense witness is testifying truthfully. 
 301  ARISTOTLE, supra note 49, bk. VI, ch. 11, at 186; see also KRONMAN, supra note 120, 
at 41 (“The young, [Aristotle] says, are handicapped by their lack of experience and on the 
whole deliberate less well than those who have seen more of life.”). 
 302 Smith, supra note 13, at 378–79. 
 303 Id. at 396. 
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A lawyer who cannot defend his activities as consistent with first person 
values is forced to “‘live one way in town and another way [at] home.’”304  
Daniel Markovits has recently argued that the commonly observed “crisis 
in the legal profession” is caused by exclusively role-based solutions to the 
problems of ethics.305  The principal thesis of contemporary legal ethics is 
the “adversary system excuse”; that is, that a lawyer must prefer his client’s 
interests over his own, and therefore must at times do things that he 
personally perceives as abhorrent or immoral.306 
Bridging the gulf between third personal and first personal ethical 
ideals may be easier for prosecutors than most lawyers, because 1) they are 
not constrained by duties to live clients, and 2) they can imbue the open-
ended “seek justice” mandate with their own values, thus avoiding harsh 
conflict between their personal and professional lives. 
Over twenty years ago, Anthony Kronman described the lawyer-
statesmen role as “an ideal of character” which is “capable of offering . . . 
deep personal meaning to those who view their professional responsibilities 
in its light.”307  While Kronman was pessimistic about whether the lawyer-
statesmen ideal could be revived in light of the realities of modern law 
practice and trends toward specialization in legal education, he 
acknowledged that this construct of professionalism may continue to exist 
in pockets of practice: 
Individuals, perhaps, may find a way to honor this ideal in their own 
careers.  But increasingly, I fear, they will be able to do so only by . . . 
searching out the cracks and crevices in which a person devoted to the 
ideal of the lawyer-statesmen may still make a living in the law.308 
Criminal prosecutions may be one such “crack[] or crevice[]” where 
individuals can still practice law without doing violence to their personal 
ideals, assuming they are willing to interpret the “seek justice” mandate as 
more than a mere platitude.  If they are to succeed, however, a renewed 
 
 304 See Shaffer, supra note 28, at 879 (quoting HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 
267 (1960)). 
 305 Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 209, 290 (2003). 
 306 Id. at 211, 216.  Markovits describes a profession where lawyers are able to justify 
their morally troubling actions in impartial terms based on duties to third parties, but they 
cannot simultaneously “cast them as components of a life [they] can happily endorse.”  Id. 
at 225.  Markovits encourages us to adopt a greater focus on personal integrity rather than 
role fulfillment in discussions of legal ethics.  Id. at 224.  “[E]ach person continues to need 
to identify specifically with his own actions, to see them as contributing to his peculiar 
ethical ambitions in light of the fact that he occupies a special position of intimacy and 
concern—of authorship—with respect to his own actions and life plan.”  Id. 
 307 KRONMAN, supra note 120, at 362. 
 308 Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
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emphasis on the virtues will be critical to promoting and preserving their 
moral integrity. 
 
